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ABSTRACT 
 
The concept of agency remains contested in anthropology. One aspect of 
the debate spans from those who, on the one hand, insist that agency is exclusive 
to living human beings, with all its accompanying implication, to those who, on the 
other, believe that non-living, non-human things also exert agency. Posthumous 
agency straddles this debate with its strange creature: the dead human being. In this 
thesis, however, I seek to examine how the dead in the context of Facebook 
challenge existing literature on the agency of the dead. While the agency of the dead 
has been recently garnering scholarly attention, this interest has focused largely on 
the agentive capacity of the corporeal remains of the person: corpse, ashes, bones. 
The dead do not simply remain dead; they remain socially, symbolically, and 
mnemonically significant. They further live on through distributed instances of their 
personhood, through their material possessions or through their surviving social 
relationships. I apply Alfred Gell’s theory of the art nexus to examine how the 
agency of the dead is abducted through their corporeal, material, and social remains. 
Building on three thematic treatments of posthumous agency as heuristic, I analyze 
the presence of the dead on Facebook to demonstrate and expound on their 
posthumous agency. The findings of this thesis affirm the fuzzy boundaries of 
agency that make agency slippery enough to be applied to the dead, to be distributed 
across one’s social network, and to be shared with digital technology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine a scenario where the dead will surpass the number of living users 
on Facebook.  This could happen in less than a century from now.1 Whether or not 
Facebook will still be extant in 2098, there is a trend towards an increasing number 
of the deceased on this social network site. Although there are no official mortality 
statistics released by Facebook, one frequently cited source, The Digital Beyond, 
predicts that by 2016, there will be 972,295 dead Facebook users from the United 
States alone.2 This is an increase from an earlier prediction made in 2010, which 
calculated 385,968 Facebook user deaths from the US alone.3 With its current 1.71 
billion monthly active users and its growing number of dead users, Facebook is 
poised to become the world’s largest cemetery.4  
   
Unlike cemeteries, the status of the deceased on Facebook may not always 
be immediately apparent.  Without protocols for identifying the deceased online, 
the dead can be indistinguishable from the living (Bollmer 2013, p. 145). When 
Facebook was launched in 2004, it did not have any provisions nor guidelines for 
dealing with user deaths. It was only in 2009 when the company introduced 
“account memorialization for deceased users”.5 Facebook’s Help Center describes 
memorialized accounts as “a place for friends and family to gather and share 
                                                
1	http://fusion.net/story/276237/the-number-of-dead-people-on-facebook-will-soon-
outnumber-the-living/	
2	http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/2016/01/972000-u-s-facebook-users-will-die-in-2016/	
3	https://web.archive.org/web/20110303040511/http://blog.entrustet.com/2010/09/03/	
how-we-calculated-that-three-facebook-users-die-every-minute/	
4	http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-
worldwide/	
5	https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2009/08/facebook-announces-privacy-improvements-in-
response-to-recommendations-by-canadian-privacy-commissioner/	
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memories after a person has passed away”.6 One of the company’s executives 
explained that the introduction of memorialized profiles7 mirrored the “reality” that 
“When someone leaves us, they don't leave our memories or our social network.”8 
Aside from memorializing accounts, Facebook further offers the option to delete 
permanently the accounts of the deceased. Ongoing activity in the still-active 
profiles of the deceased evoke various sensibilities. As one bereaved family member 
commented online: 
I have been trying to find out how to get people to stop posting on my 
recently decesed [sic] family member who was young, as the family we 
requested people stop tagging him in pictures and stop posting beucase 
[sic] it is disrespectful and its [sic] too new of a death to have to see it 
plastered all over facebook.9  
 
 Even with these options, deceased accounts are, for the most part, neither 
memorialized nor deleted. Facebook memorializes or deletes an account only at the 
discretion of the pre-deceased user who decides beforehand what happens to his 
or her account in case of death, or upon the request of a family member or friend. 
While pre-deceased account owners can consent to have their profile memorialized 
or deleted, these actions could only be triggered if family and friends report the 
user’s death to Facebook. The dead maintain a posthumous presence through their 
open and active profiles where they are tagged, liked, and mentioned by others.  
Their posthumous profiles are enlivened with messages, photos, and videos still 
                                                
6	https://www.facebook.com/help/103897939701143?helpref=uf_permalink	
7	Your	profile,	is	your	collection	of	the	photos,	stories	and	experiences	that	tell	your	story.	
Your	profile	also	includes	your	Timeline.	
https://www.facebook.com/help/133986550032744?helpref=faq_content	
8	https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/memories-of-friends-departed-endure-on-
facebook/163091042130/	
9	https://www.facebook.com/help/community/question/?id=10202627332499825	
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being shared, posted, commented, and liked on their Timeline.10 Any activity 
generated when others interact with their profiles may show up on other people’s 
news feed, prompting others concerning their abiding presence on Facebook. 
Moreover, without the restrictions of memorialized profiles, the dead can “appear 
in public spaces such as in suggestions for People You May Know, ads or birthday 
reminders.”11  
  
 The dead on Facebook do not remain as inert presences. Before 2015, when 
a profile was reported for memorialization, Facebook locks that account from being 
accessed and modified by other users. Other users who have been privy to the 
deceased’s password, of course, are able to fully control the accounts of those who 
have passed away. A recent feature, however, further enlivens memorialized 
profiles. In 2015, Facebook introduced legacy contact, which allowed predeceased 
users to designate a family member or friend to manage their accounts 
posthumously.12 A legacy contact can primarily perform three actions for a 
memorialized profile: pin a post on the timeline, accept friend requests, and update 
its profile and cover photo. Although these actions are limited in comparison to 
what can be done when a user has full and direct access to an account, by generating 
profile activity which seemingly emanates from the account itself, the passive 
memorialized profile becomes more animated and active in its social network.   
 
                                                
10	Timeline	is	the	space	on	one’s	profile	page	where	one	can	see	one’s	own	posts,	posts	from	
friends	and	stories	one	is	tagged	in,	organized	according	to	the	date	they	were	posted.		
https://www.facebook.com/help/1462219934017791?helpref=faq_content	
11	https://www.facebook.com/help/103897939701143?helpref=uf_permalink	
12	https://www.facebook.com/help/1568013990080948?helpref=faq_content	
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 The exponentially growing number of the dead within Facebook’s massive 
and global active user population and, consequently, the inevitability of 
encountering enlivened posthumous presences on this social network site present 
an engaging anthropological study. How do we make sense of those who have 
passed away but remain on social network sites like Facebook?  
 
 Scholarly interest in death on Facebook has largely focused on how the 
technology has been appropriated to facilitate the grieving processes of the 
bereaved. Sofka’s (1997) article on the World Wide Web and the Internet as 
‘thanatechnology13’ outlined early online bereavement practices that eventually 
shaped succeeding research interests which centered on grief and memorialization 
on the internet. Since then, scholars have examined online memorialization through 
web memorials and virtual cemeteries (Roberts & Vidal 2000; De Vries & 
Rutherford 2004; Nager & De Vries 2004; Roberts 2004a, 2004b) and social 
network sites (Lombard & Markaridian Selverian 2008; Brubaker & Vertesi 2010; 
Brubaker et al. 2013). These studies have emphasized the value of online 
memorialization as a meaningful expansion and continuation of traditional 
bereavement practices.  
  
 The use of Facebook as a particular thanatechnology by the living to 
maintain their relationship with the dead complements the “continuing bonds” 
theory (Silverman & Nickman 1996), which proposes that it is normal for the 
                                                
13	 Sofka	 (1997,	p.	553)	defines	 thanatechnology	 as	 “technological	 resources	 such	as	videos,	
computer-assisted	instruction	programs	…	and	interactive	videodiscs	that	can	be	used	to	gain	
information	about	topics	in	thanatology.”	
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bereaved to maintain an ongoing, dynamic, and interactive relationship with the 
deceased.  The notion of continuing bonds has been employed in recent scholarship 
as a framework to explain how and why the bereaved use memorialized Facebook 
profiles (Getty et al. 2011; Degroot 2012; Kasket 2012; Bell et al. 2015; Irwin 2015). 
Just as these findings provide evidence for the persistence of bonds beyond death, 
they also authenticate the experience of how the dead in the digital realm are being 
kept alive and present by the living. That the dead are viewed as having some kind 
of social existence is a key step in arguing that continuing bonds and the persistent 
online interaction of the living with the dead are crucial in establishing and ensuring 
the requisite sociality that confer certain attributes on the online dead. I further 
suggest that this sociality is in fact influenced by the social agency of the dead.  
 
 Classic anthropological writings emphasize the social nature of death 
(Huntington & Metcalf 1979; Bloch & Parry 1982; Hertz [1960] 2004). Death is 
more than just the biological cessation of life; it produces social life, as one can 
observe from various funeral and mortuary rituals across cultures. Through these 
rituals, the corporeality of the dead is imbued with, and seen as possessing, social 
presence, which may not necessarily require the presence of the actual physical 
corpse (Hallam et al. 1999). One cannot conceive, however, of the dead’s social 
presence without resorting to the mediation of material culture (Hallam & Hockey 
2001).  I take these insights to argue that the dead, despite the absence of their 
actual corporeality on social network sites, retain social presence because of the 
mediation of digital technology.  
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 Agency is commonly assumed to be distinctive of human beings. For 
Bandura (2006, p. 164), the capacity to carry out an intention is one of the core 
properties of human agency. On  other hand, however, there are those who contend 
that agency may not always be appraised by intentionality. According to Giddens 
(1984, p. 9), “Agency refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but 
to their capability of doing those things in the first place (which is why agency 
implies power)”.  While these opposing notions seem to converge on the idea of 
agency as capacity, Dobres and Robb (2000, p. 3) remark that “there is little 
consensus about what ‘agency’ actually means”. Knappett and Malafouris (2008, p. 
x) further insist that, despite this ambiguity, agency remains contested within the 
“theoretical margins of a narrow anthropocentric perspective.”   
  
 Alfred Gell’s (1998) theory on the agency of art objects attempts to step 
beyond agency’s anthropocentric preoccupation. While Gell has not completely 
given primary, self-sufficient agency to objects, he argues that his concept of object 
agency is “relational and context dependent”. Following Giddens (1984), Gell also 
focuses on agency as the capacity to effect. For Gell, “an agent is one who ‘causes 
events to happen’ in their vicinity … (not necessarily the events which were 
‘intended’ by the agent)” (1998, p. 16). Recently, scholars have applied Gell’s work 
to argue for the agency of the dead. 
   
 In anthropological literature, the agency of the dead has come to signify 
many things: the political potency of the dead bodies (Verdery 1999), the social 
agency of the groomed corpse (Harper 2010), and the post-mortem, effective 
agency of dismembered body parts (Tung 2014). These anthropological writings, 
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however, have circumscribed agency to the actual corporeal remains of the dead. 
This resonates with the prevailing tendency to view agency as “an attribute of the 
human substance” (Knappett & Malafouris 2008, p. x). I apply Alfred Gell’s theory 
of the art nexus to examine how the agency of the dead are abducted through their 
corporeal, material, and social remains. Building on three thematic treatments of 
posthumous agency as heuristic, I analyze the presence of dead on Facebook to 
demonstrate and expound on their posthumous agency. This thesis argues that the 
online dead, in the absence of their corporeal and physical remains, can acquire and 
exert posthumous agency. I do not intend, however, to pin agency on the dead as 
an entity, but I argue that posthumous agency on Facebook is socially distributed 
(Wertsch et al. 1996) and technologically mediated (Dobres & Hoffman 1994). This 
argument will unfold in the next six chapters.  
 
In Chapter One, I trace anthropology's contribution to the study of death 
to show that death is socially constructed. I argue that the sociality of death 
guarantees the posthumous social presence of the dead. I tackle two main 
objections to this argument by analyzing the ambivalence created by death's social 
character, and by addressing the purported death taboo in modern discourse. I 
conclude this chapter suggesting that the ambivalent and shifting discourses create 
a milieu where the dead cannot be ignored. 
 
In Chapter Two, I begin with a general discussion of agency that 
emphasizes the need for defining the concept despite its contested articulations. I 
venture into initially defining agency as the capacity to act, suggesting that such a 
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further argue that since the concept of agency is historically contingent and socially 
mediated, shifting contexts provide new avenues for conceptualizing agency that 
moves beyond its anthropocentrism. I review the literature on the agency of the 
dead to frame how I intend to approach the question of posthumous agency on 
Facebook. Finally, I present how the presence of the dead online have affected the 
way people are interacting with the deceased.  
 
In Chapter Three, I explore the theme of posthumous agency as the agency 
of the corpse. I show that the corpse is a unique, concrete entity, which is neither a 
subject nor an object, but mediates agency through its manifold effects and 
possibilities. I also show that the corpse matters a significantly in evoking 
posthumous agency because its matter embodies the personhood of the deceased. 
I further show that the materiality of the corpse creates copresence for the dead, 
which in turn, generates a phenomenal sense of agency for the corpse. While I show 
how the corpse’s agency is abducted from the primary agency of the pre-deceased, 
I argue that the peculiar characteristics of the corpse’s materiality augment and 
intensify the agency of the dead.  
 
In Chapter Four, I discuss the importance of material culture to our 
relationship with death and the dead. I show how materiality mediates the presence 
and agency of the dead; media technology affords them with a platform to preserve 
and circulate their agency. I argue in this chapter that the objects of the dead 
become agents through an abduction of the pre-deceased’s agency, which is always 
contextual and relational. I show the implications of this contextuality and 
relationality in terms of how objects of the dead can be potent, complex, and 
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ambivalent agents through their interactions with other agents and with human 
patients who can make infinite abductions of agency. In addition, I demonstrate 
how Gell’s art nexus helps understand how objects of the dead can evoke 
posthumous agency. 
 
In Chapter Five, I explore the theme of posthumous agency through the 
theory of continuing bonds. I argue that, though continuing bonds might assert the 
unidirectional agency of the bereaved, it affirms the agency of the dead by 
highlighting their influence in motivating the bereaved to maintain their bonds with 
the deceased. I address two major doubts that arise from certain practices of 
continuing bonds in order to highlight that continuing bonds is a deeply embodied 
and corporeal agency of the dead. I also show that continuing bonds benefit the 
dead in establishing a robust sociality that provides them with the context to 
become co-agents of their continuing posthumous social presence. I further argue 
that the continuing interest of the bereaved suggests that the agency of the dead 
encourages this interest. Moreover, I also show that posthumous agency is socially 
and culturally mediated as evidenced by the widespread but culturally diverse ways 
that people maintain their bonds with the dead. Finally, I argue that Gell’s theory is 
still relevant in theorizing the agency of the dead in continuing bonds. 
 
In Chapter Six, I address three questions to determine whether the dead on 
Facebook can be posthumous agents as well. Firstly, is there a ‘body’ on Facebook? 
Secondly, is Facebook a thing? Thirdly, does Facebook exhibit sociality? I build on 
the answers to these themes to explore how the scenario of active and public 
profiles of the dead on Facebook can express posthumous agency. Furthermore, I 
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explore how Facebook mediates the agency of the dead by distributing agency 
throughout the social network and by evoking a phenomenal sense of agency 
through telepresence. 
 
Finally, I conclude by exploring what posthumous agency on Facebook 
contributes to the ongoing debate on the nature and definition of agency. 
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CHAPTER ONE: The Social Construction of Death 
 It is often said that death is a fact of life. All living things die, from the 
simplest unicellular organisms like bacteria, to complex multicellular organisms like 
plants, animals and humans. Death does not exempt any biological creature. Death 
is the shared fate of life. Unlike the death of other living organisms, humans are the 
only creatures who problematize death. Death is a universal human experience that 
finds expression in a diverse spectrum of attitudes, beliefs, and rituals. This diversity 
alone hints at the peculiarity of the death of human beings. While human death 
seems like an obvious biological certainty, it is a concept that cannot simply be 
conceived as a natural occurrence, reducible to the cessation of biological functions.  
 
 One of the peculiarities of human death, according to the philosopher Marx 
Wartofsky (1988, p. 219), is that “a person has to be declared dead, i.e., that human 
death, unlike animal death, is a socially constituted fact requiring a judgment”. While 
this peculiarity does not disregard death as a biological fact, he further suggests that 
the determination and validation of death through medical or scientific procedures 
may not be as neutral and objective as we assume because “human biology is the 
biology of essentially social-historical beings”.   
 
 A cursory glance at the literature suggests that death for human beings is 
far more complicated. Conceptualizations and attitudes towards death have 
changed over the centuries (Ariés 1974, 1981). The experience of dying is 
contingent on social and historical changes (Kellehear 2007). Not only does death 
have a complicated history, it is also experienced and understood differently across 
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cultures.  Historical and ethnographic evidence illustrate that death is neither 
uniform nor ‘natural’ as it is assumed to be (Goody 1962; Rosenblatt et al. 1976; 
Huntington & Metcalf 1979; Bloch & Parry 1982; Palgi & Abramovitch 1984; 
Lombard & Ditton; Davies 2005). The anthropologist Douglas Davies (2000, p. 
100) sums up this general understanding: “Death is, intrinsically, not natural. It does 
not belong to the realm of nature, as such, because it befalls human beings, and 
human beings are social beings”.  
 
In this brief opening chapter, I trace anthropology's contribution to the 
study of death to show that death is socially constructed. I argue that the sociality 
of death guarantees the posthumous social presence of the dead. I tackle two main 
objections to this argument by analyzing the ambivalence created by death's social 
character, and by addressing the purported death taboo in modern discourse. I 
conclude this chapter suggesting that the ambivalent and shifting discourses create 
a milieu where the dead cannot be ignored.  
 
 In 1907, Robert Hertz published “Contribution à une étude sur la représentation 
collective de la mort” in the French journal, Année Sociologique. When it was translated 
eventually into English and published in 1960, A Contribution to the Study of the 
Collective Representation of Death became a landmark theoretical reference in death 
studies. Hertz’s (p. 86) important contribution can be summed up in his definition 
of death “as a social phenomenon [that] consists in a dual and painful process of 
mental disintegration and synthesis”. 
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 As a social phenomenon, Hertz points out that death does not only result 
in the cessation of biological life, but it also “destroys the social being grafted upon 
the physical individual” (p. 77). Moreover, he goes on to show that the social 
character of death manifests itself in the twofold process of funerary rites—the 
double burial—where the dead are initially stripped of their pre-deceased status and 
temporarily excluded from the social world of the living, and then eventually, 
reintegrated and bestowed a new status in society. In other words, Hertz asserts 
that death cannot be conceived only as a single event, but an unfolding process that 
does not culminate in “mere destruction but a transition” (p. 48). The construction 
of death as transition suggests an underlying sociality that reconstitutes the dead 
back into social circulation by reconfiguring the relationship between the living and 
the dead. It means that, ultimately, death does not result in the categorical exclusion 
of the dead from the world of the living. Instead, the living bring the dead back to 
life, so to speak, through a process that bestows on them a kind of social presence 
that outlives their biological existence.    
 
 The transitional process where the dead are separated from society, 
reconstituted, and reintegrated back into the community becomes intelligible 
through Arnold van Gennep’s (1960) notion of ‘rites of passage’. van Gennep 
argues that rites of passage—rites which accompany changes in a person’s life and 
are characterized by separation, transition, and incorporation—facilitate the 
conferral of a new social status for individuals. He cites funerals as an example 
where deceased individuals undergo a ceremony where they are formally 
incorporated into the world of the dead (p. 146). Even though the deceased have 
been relegated to the world of the dead, it does not necessarily mean that they have 
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ceased their social standing in the world of the living. Following van Gennep’s idea, 
death is merely another rite of passage in the course of a person’s life. One does 
not lose social status in death; rather, one acquires a new social status.   
 
 van Gennep asserts that “changes of condition do not occur without 
disturbing the life of society and the individual” (p. 13). Similarly, death can be seen 
as a radical change of condition that creates an overwhelming disturbance. Death 
does not only fundamentally alter the individual, but, more importantly, it also 
brings about a rupture in the life of a community that its effects on society must be 
mitigated by rituals. Evoking van Gennep’s claim that “it is the function of rites of 
passage to reduce their harmful effects” (p. 13), death rituals pacify and smooth out 
the disruptions that death causes in society. In van Gennep’s view, the dead cannot 
just be left for dead; they must be brought back from the dead somehow to preserve 
stability in society. Death may temporarily disrupt the social order, but the ritual 
practices that attend to the dead, ensure the restoration of what has been disrupted.  
 
 Restoration does not necessarily mean that the dead are reinstated entirely 
in their predeceased state since this would be obviously impossible. Victor Turner’s 
(1969) analysis of Ndembu rituals clarify how the dead can be meaningfully 
reintegrated.  For Turner, rituals are not only indicative of the transitions that 
happen, but they are also constitutive of the transitions (1973, p. 93), which suggests 
that Turner views rituals as having a “creative function” (Hockey 2002, p. 215). In 
other words, the rites for the dead create a social space where the dead can occupy 
a meaningful place in society. Through ritual performances, the dead undergo a 
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process of transition that eventually culminates in the re-acquisition of a social 
status and presence which grants them the stature to wield influence over the living.  
 
 Drawing from a wider range of ethnographic examples, Richard 
Huntington and Peter Metcalfe (1979) further explore the theme of death as 
transition. Across cultures, death and life are intertwined. Death as transition 
generates social life. This can be seen in the communal activity that marks funeral 
rites. In describing the funeral practices of the Bara people of Madagascar, 
Huntington and Metcalf (p. 115) expound on how "extreme vitality is generated 
through the various excesses of the funeral celebration". The energy stirred up 
through the songs, dances, and games occasioned by these funerals have a deeper 
significance. These activities symbolize the vitality needed to facilitate the transition 
of the deceased from the world of the living into the world of the dead. Just as the 
living are assisted when they are born, likewise, the dead are to be assisted as they 
are reborn in the world of their ancestors. Continuity ensues as the dead rightfully 
take their place among their ancestors. In this sense, the intersecting world of the 
living and the dead are harmoniously reconciled. Ancestorship signifies the 
reintegration of the dead into the normal, everyday life of the living.  
 
 The association of death with life can further be seen in the prevalence of 
sexuality and fertility symbolisms in funeral and mortuary rituals (Bloch & Parry 
1982). The liminality in death rituals effects creativity and generativity. Far from 
being an annihilating principle, death perpetuates the life of a society by establishing 
continuity through its rituals which attend to the transition that both the dead and 
the living undergo. Echoing the constitutive function of rituals, Maurice Bloch and 
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Jonathan Parry (p. 6) insist that these funeral and mortuary rituals produce a social 
order where the living and the dead coexist. This coexistence thus shows that death 
does not take the dead out of social circulation. 
 
 Anthropology’s contribution to the study of death has largely derived from 
its focus on funeral and mortuary rituals (Hertz 1960; Goody 1962; Huntington & 
Metcalf 1979; Bloch & Parry 1982; Robben 2004). In studying these rituals, 
anthropological literature generally upholds the view that death is a social 
phenomenon characterized by the disruption and recuperation of the social order. 
Death exhibits a paradoxical sociality: just as death disturbs social life, it also 
generates social life. This is evidenced by the publicity and communality of the 
rituals and mourning practices performed by the living for the dead. These 
performances constitute the transitional process that happens to both the dead and 
the living. The construction of death as transition implies that the dead and the 
living are enmeshed in a robust sociality that vivifies the phenomenon of death and 
eventually reintegrates the dead back into the social sphere of the living.  
 
What has been outlined above demonstrates that death does not end in the 
complete/wholesale severing of the ties of the dead with the living. As the living 
maintain their connections with the dead, the dead continue to be significant and 
relevant to the living. This relationship manifests a reciprocal and complementary 
sociality where the abiding presence of the dead is constructed simultaneously by 
how the dead can influence the living, and how the living remember the dead. In 
short, I have shown how anthropological literature reveals death to be indicative 
and constitutive of a sociality that guarantees posthumous social presence.  
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 It could be argued that the sociality of death engenders an ambivalence that 
can revoke the social status of the dead. The social construction of death validates 
the claim that attitudes towards death and dying are changing (Ariés 1974, 1981; 
Kellehear 2007).  One could assume that changes in how death is viewed places the 
dead in a precarious social position. Certain shifts, such as a discourse open to 
death, could turn out to support favorably the ongoing social interactions of the 
living and the dead. Certain outcomes, such as evolving taboos on death, however, 
could also unfavorably restrict the dead and the living to their exclusive domains. 
Rather than ensuring the dead’s social presence, the inconclusiveness arising from 
the fluidity of death’s social nature could turn out to be counterproductive.  
 
 This uncertainty, however, must not be construed as an either-or, win-lose 
situation. Bronislaw Malinowski ([1925] 1948, p. 30) demonstrates that people have 
an “extremely complex” attitude towards death—which translates into ambivalent 
manifestations of "love of the dead and loathing of the corpse, passionate 
attachment to the personality still lingering about the body and a shattering fear of 
the gruesome thing that has been left over". He emphasizes that these attitudes 
appear simultaneously, often contradictorily, in how people grieve and mourn the 
dead. As he explains, “never do the negative elements appear alone or even 
dominant” ([1925] 1948, p. 30). Death appears to be a profound social 
phenomenon that resists dichotomization. The ambivalence arising out of the 
sociality of death/social character of death is best construed as situated somewhere 
within a continuum of complex, contradictory emotional and cognitive responses. 
The dead cannot but evoke a reaction from the living, implying not only their 
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emotivity but also their social potency. This ensures the dead of an abiding place in 
the social world of the living. 
 
 It could be also argued that the social status of the dead hinges on the 
predominant discourse. For instance, it has been claimed that death has evolved 
into a modern taboo where death has become “‘unmentionable’ as a natural 
process”  (Gorer 1955, p. 50), “shameful and forbidden” (Ariés 1974, p. 85) and 
“hidden because it is ugly and dirty” (Ariés 1981, p. 563). The marginalization of 
the dying (Glasser & Strauss 1965; Elias 1985)the privatization of grief and 
mourning (Gorer 1955; Ariés 1974) and the effacement, cosmeticization, and 
sequestration of the dead ((Mellor & Shilling 1993; Emerick 2000) have all been 
cited as consequences of this taboo. Being situated in a death-denying cultural 
milieu (Becker 1973; Kübler-Ross [1969] 2009) could be doubly fatal for the dead. 
A widespread denial of death could end up in denying a public and discursive space 
for the dead.  
 
 The death taboo, however, has also received some criticisms. The 
sociologist Allan Kellehear (1984) in a pioneering essay critiques that there is little 
sociological evidence to support the claim that death is being denied in society. In 
another work, the sociologist and death studies scholar Tony Walter (1991, p. 297) 
argues that the death taboo is “grossly overdrawn and lacking in subtlety”. 
Interestingly, the works that asserted that there was a death taboo were published 
around the time when the quantity of academic literature on death was already on 
an upsurge (Fulton 1976). The psychiatrist Michael Simpson (1979, p. vii) called out 
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the irony of claiming a taboo when he published his annotated bibliography of 
death-related topics:  
Death is a very badly kept secret; such an unmentionable and taboo 
topic that there are now 750 books now in print asserting that we are 
ignoring the subject. At no time in history has there been so much 
attention paid to death as a subject for scholarly and literary study, 
clinical and research attention, or for cynical commercial exploitation. 
 
 While recent surveys of the history of death in the Western world recognize 
that, at some point, a taboo may have existed as evidenced firstly, by the paucity of 
literature on the topic and secondly, by the fact it was rarely discussed in academia; 
since the 1960s, however, the discourse on death has already burgeoned into a 
prolific and expansive field (Doka 2003; Kastenbaum 2003; Wood & Williamson 
2003; Davies 2005; Green 2008). The growing multi-disciplinary literature on death 
attests to the changing discursive landscape (Walter 2008). Anthropology, once 
criticized by Johannes Fabian (1972) for its parochialized understanding of death, 
has also expanded beyond its original interest in mortuary and funeral practices 
(Scheper-Hughes 1993; Lock 2002; Rosaldo [1989] 1993). Even scholars who 
premised their work on consequent issues of the death taboo such as the 
sequestration of death (Mellor & Shilling 1993; Willmott 2000; Lee 2008; Stanley & 
Wise 2011) and the invisibility of death in the media and in public discourse (Walter 
et al. 1995; Hanusch 2008) have opened up conceptual and semantic spaces that 
attest to the waning of a taboo that previously barred death from being discussed 
publicly.   
 
 Nevertheless, whether death is taboo or not, these shifting discourses are 
best understood, as I have pointed out earlier, along a continuum of twin, 
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contradictory attitudes (Malinowski [1925] 1948). While these shifts may influence 
how individuals and societies deal with the dead, it does not compromise the social 
significance of the dead. Instead, the variable nature of these discourses attests to 
the robust sociality underpinning the phenomenon of death. A taboo, as Mary 
Douglas (1979, p. 2771) explains, “upholds a cultural system…a pattern of values 
and norms”. Seen from this perspective, the death taboo, which may have raised 
anxieties about the status of death in modern society, turns into an affirmation of 
how death continues to be socially mediated. The dead stand to benefit from this 
social mediation as it ensures that society will always have to deal with the dead.  
 
 I have expounded in this chapter on the social nature of death. In outlining 
the contributions of anthropological literature, I have argued that the dead are 
embedded in a sociality which grants social existence beyond death. I have further 
suggested that the ambivalence in terms of attitudes and discourses guarantee the 
dead's presence in the social sphere of the living. In sum, the dead will always have 
a place in society; their presence cannot be ignored. The ways the living deal with 
death establish a sociality that invoke the dead’s potent social presence.  
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CHAPTER TWO: The Contested Concept of Agency 
  
People respond differently when I tell them that my research topic deals 
with dead people on Facebook. Usually, those who are not on Facebook would 
look at me with an incredulous expression. Those who are on Facebook, however, 
would often share an anecdote about their reactions on chancing upon a still-active 
profile of the dead.  My personal interest in the topic goes back to 2009 when a 
colleague who had died suddenly posted a public status update that appeared on 
my news feed. His post reminded everyone that it had been 40 days since he died 
and that he was asking for prayers.  In an instant, his profile buzzed with comments: 
How did you do this? (FB Friend 1). 
Calling Facebook Security! (FB Friend 2). 
I found out later that his sister managed to hack into his account and posted on his 
behalf: 
I was able to get in by guessing his security questions in his yahoo email 
account.  
 
Eventually, the shock wore off as I got used to his popping up every now and then 
whenever his friends on Facebook would tag him in their photos or in their own 
status updates. In fact, any activity on his profile page would appear on my news 
feed. Meanwhile, his sister has desisted from posting and commenting as ‘him’, 
while she still has access to his account, and sometimes replies to people on his 
behalf. She has been appending her name at the end of her messages to avoid 
confusing or scaring anyone off.   
 
I recently visited and scrolled through my colleague’s profile page. 
Apparently, it has not been converted into a memorialized profile, and so it 
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remained an active profile retaining the same privacy settings when my colleague 
was still alive. Since nothing has changed in terms of how it allowed or prevented 
others from interacting with him on Facebook, his profile page continues to elicit 
tags, likes, loves, and comments from other people. I found one of the earliest posts 
left by one of his friends, just a few days after he died:  
It's still nice to be able to "talk" to you here, whether you know it or 
not. I wonder if they delete inactive pages after a while. I hope not. I 
miss you. (FB Friend 1).  
 
Fast forward almost seven years to now, his profile page has neither been deleted 
nor left inactive. In fact, people still greeted him on his most recent birthday: 
Hey! (FB Friend 2). 
You continue to be a blessing (FB Friend 3). 
Watch over us (FB Friend 4).  
Please pray for us (FB Friend 5). 
I know you are watching over all of us (FB Friend 6).  
 
Some of his friends posted more often than others, usually reminiscing on 
memories and leaving messages addressed to him: 
7 years, buddy! And it feels juuuuust like yesterday. Demmet. Do you 
miss us at all? (FB Friend 8).  
 
One would assume that the profile pages of the deceased would remain dormant 
since account owners would already be dead. On the contrary, it seems that the 
dead have not left the social space that they have inhabited on Facebook. 
Furthermore, their presence seems to be enlivened by “friends” who continue to 
interact with them in the many relational affordances of the social media platform.  
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In the first section of this chapter, I begin with a general discussion of 
agency that emphasizes the need for defining the concept despite its contested 
articulations. I venture into initially defining agency as the capacity to act, suggesting 
that such a definition breaches a predominantly exclusive view of agency as human 
property. I further argue that since the concept of agency is historically contingent 
and socially mediated, shifting contexts provide new avenues for conceptualizing 
agency that moves beyond its anthropocentrism. In the second section, I review the 
literature on the agency of the dead to frame how I intend to approach the question 
of posthumous agency on Facebook. In the final section, I present how the 
presence of the dead online have affected the way people are interacting with the 
deceased.  
 
I begin my argument for the agency of the dead on Facebook by clarifying 
first what I mean by agency, to sustain my argument that the contours of this 
posthumous presence are indeed agentive.  Theorizations of agency run an entire 
gamut. There is barely a consensus on a universally accepted definition (Dobres & 
Robb 2000); the concept itself remains disputed in anthropology and in other 
disciplines. Laura Ahearn (2001, p. 112) concedes that her own “provisional 
definition”— “agency refers to the socioculturally mediated capacity to act”—
barely illustrates the spectrum of detailed views regarding the concept. Just because 
the concept is still being debated does not mean that initial attempts to clarify 
agency will end up like a cat chasing its own tail. Ahearn (2001, p. 130) proposes 
that “scholars using the term must define it clearly, both for themselves and for 
their readers”. Moreover, Webb Keane (2003) makes a case for the responsible use 
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of anthropological concepts. Thus, the purpose of defining how agency is going to 
be deployed in this thesis counts as a step towards clarity and accountability.  
 
The word agency is derived from the Latin verb, agere, which means “to do” 
or “to act”. This etymological approach shows how doing or acting lies at the heart 
of the concept of agency. When I do something—write a thesis, for instance—I am 
manifesting agency. When someone reads what I’ve written, that person is also 
expressing agency. Agency, however, is not only evidenced by the moment that an 
act is being done or after it has been done. Going back to our etymological exercise, 
the infinitive form of the verbs “to do” or “to act” reveals agency to be constituted 
before the act; an agent is one who has the capacity to do something. Extending 
these examples can lead us to conclude that anything that anyone does, did, or could 
do are expressions of agency. Probing this tentative conclusion, however, unravels 
some of the debates surrounding the notion of agency.  In the examples above, we 
hastily assume that agency, in the sense of doing, being able to do, and having done 
something, is exclusive to human beings. But what about other creatures who could 
“do” or “act” or manifest the capacity to do so, such as dogs who excitedly greet 
you when you come home from work? Are these dogs expressing agency? How 
about things who can “do” something or are capable of doing something, such as 
a pen that writes out what you want to write? Is the pen also showing agency? If 
seeing an apple entices you to eat it, would that apple be an agent that stokes your 
appetite? As we can see, agency as the capacity “to do” or “to act” could not just 
be an exclusively human attribute since it can be extended to dogs, pens, and apples.  
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Nevertheless, there is a strong predilection for agency to be conceived as 
distinctively and exclusively human. Part of it could be ascribed to what Ahearn 
(2001) describes as the “agentive turn” in anthropological discourse. She notes how 
interest in the concept of agency arose out of the social movements and political 
conditions, mostly in the US and in Europe, from the 1960s until the early 1990s: 
“As a result of witnessing and participating in actions aimed at transforming society, 
then, many academics have begun to investigate how practices can either reproduce 
or transform the very structures that shape them” (Ahearn 2001, p. 110). The 
emergence of this concern for “practice, praxis, action, interaction, activity, 
experience, performance” is necessarily linked to the importance of the “agent, 
actor, person, self, individual, subject” as the “doer of all that doing” (Ortner 1984, 
p. 144). In addition, Ahearn (2001, p. 110) situates the elevation of the human agent 
within “postmodern and poststructuralist critiques” that challenged “impersonal 
master narratives that leave no room for tensions, contradictions, or oppositional 
actions on the part of individuals and collectivities”.  I have laid out this historical 
and ideological background to contextualize why the concept of agency has tended 
to be focused on human agency. While other scholars have criticized agency’s 
“narrow anthropocentric perspective” (Knappett & Malafouris 2008, p. x), the fact 
that the importance given to human agency was contingent on geographical and 
historical circumstances suggests that changing temporal, spatial, social, and cultural 
contexts can also displace agency from its anthropocentric preoccupation. In 
reframing the agency-structure debate, Bourdieu (1977, 2000), Giddens (1979, 
1984), and Ortner (2006) emphasize how agency, in general, is mediated and 
negotiated. Despite the anthropocentric assumption, this particular insight seems 
to open the door for other modes and expressions of agency. In other words, 
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context essentially produces the quality of agency as well as the kind of agent that 
exercises it.     
 
If the focus on human agency was contingent on historical and cultural 
factors, consider how today’s techno-social context could likewise reshape our 
understanding of agency. Mary Chayko (2014, p. 976) describes the techno-social life 
as one lived in “societies rich in digital (i.e., computerized) communication 
technology [with plentiful] opportunities to share information, identify 
interpersonal commonalities, get to know others, and interact, and form social 
connections”. Though it might now seem pointless to speculate on a hypothetical 
past, I find worth in imagining what the pertinent questions regarding agency would 
be, if the academics to whom Ahearn referred, were immersed in today’s techno-
social life? To put it in another way, given the affordances of agency in a digitally 
connected world and without the ethical imperative that motivated the evaluation 
of the role of the human agent, would agency still be predominantly theorized from 
an anthropocentric perspective? These questions might not be a purely speculative 
exercise after all, since we are living right in the midst of a world that is increasingly 
techno-social. 
 
The world of interconnected individuals, whose personal access to digital 
technology allows them to reach out conveniently and instantaneously to as many 
people in as many places, has altered how social movements and upheavals are 
being organized and carried out. In his discussion of the Global Now, Arjun 
Appadurai (1996, p. 7) describes how electronic media and its consumption 
“provokes” agency on a globalized scale. For instance, Eltantawy & Wiest (2011) 
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demonstrates the role of social media platforms in generating the momentum and 
mobilizing the collective protest that supported the successful Egyptian revolution 
of 2011 against the dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak. This historical event shows how 
digital technology enhances the role and the power of the agent. In such a context, 
reclaiming human agency seems less of an issue than examining how agency has 
come to attain such an effect. The efficaciousness of technologically mediated 
agency decentralizes agency from being solely focused on the human individual and 
branches into a consideration of technology as an “arena for dynamic social 
interaction” (Dobres & Hoffman 1994, p. 226). This social arena is not merely 
conceptual; it is material as well. In exploring the social agency of technology, 
Dobres (1995, p. 27) stresses that technology consists of the “dialectic of social 
relations of production and things produced, and the intersection of social 
dynamics and material realities”. The interpenetration of human agency and 
materiality, in technology, seems to echo the mutually constitutive relationship of 
agency and structure in the discourses of the habitus (Bourdieu 1977) and the 
duality of structure (Giddens 1979). In a techno-social milieu, digital technology 
and agency mutually complement each other’s capacity to be phenomenally 
significant and effective. We can see how this leads to a consideration not only of 
human agency but also of the technology that makes this kind of human agency 
possible.  
 
Let me clarify: I do not intend to discard or devalue human agency in favor 
of non-human and material agency, nor am I keen on reinstating agency as the 
exclusive property of the human individual. Rather, in showing the range of possible 
conceptions of agency which are not necessarily located in living, human beings, I 
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am advocating for the creation of a space in which to situate the kind of agency that 
can be discerned from the social presence of the dead on Facebook. I argue in this 
thesis that posthumous agency on Facebook presents an effective agency that is 
non-living, non-intentional, non-corporeal, non-individual, technologically 
mediated, and socially negotiated. In advancing this claim, I intend to wean agency 
from being pinned down to a particular entity, whether human, non-human, or 
material.  
 
Agency is commonly assumed to be distinctive of human beings. It is often 
described as the capacity to act and to reflect on the act. Together, these two 
capacities are taken to be what makes agency human. While anyone or anything, for 
that matter, can act or do something, it would be difficult to assume that non-
humans and things possess the same ability to reflect, which, properly speaking, 
refers to intentionality. Alessandro Duranti (2000, p. 134) defines intentionality as 
“the property of human consciousness of being directed toward or being about 
something”. Intentionality is always consciousness about or of something. Human 
agency is rooted in a consciousness that displays an array of cognitive faculties, of 
which intentionality is only one of its features. This theme has influenced a strand 
of thinking about agency along psychological lines. For Albert Bandura (2006, pp. 
164-165), the capacity to carry out an intention, along with forethought, self-
reactiveness, and self-reflectiveness, are core properties of human agency. These 
properties form the complex of consciousness.  An awareness of doing something 
and a consciousness that what I am doing is having an effect contribute to a “sense 
of agency” (Gallagher 2007, p. 347). This overwhelming psychological tendency to 
ensconce agency within intentionality and consciousness (see Gustafson 1986; 
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Emirbayer & Mische 1998; Bandura 2006) tends to be restrictive, precluding 
explorations of other modes of agency that are not anthropocentric.  
 
The implications of circumscribing agency to intentional action comes to 
the fore when we apply this criterion to a dead person. Agency seems to assume a 
number of things regarding personhood. Firstly, it presupposes a living, human 
being. If I am dead, in the physical sense, my entire body ceases to function. I 
cannot talk. I cannot listen. I cannot write. I cannot do anything at all. Initiating an 
action is physically impossible. I cannot be an agent, in the sense of one who acts, 
since I cannot be the originator nor the performer of a physical act. However, does 
being dead necessarily mean that I cannot be seen as acting or doing? We have 
argued in the first chapter how persons retain social presence and influence beyond 
death. Surely, agency has been ascribed to the dead as much as it has been ascribed 
to the living.  Secondly, agency presumes an embodied, individual consciousness. 
If I am dead, I cease to be conscious of myself and the world. Since my 
consciousness or mind is a part of my brain’s cognitive function, when the brain 
ceases to function along with other vital bodily organs, I completely lose my twin 
capacities for action and reflection. In other words, I cannot be an agent because 
the consequences of being physically dead extinguishes my capacity for intentional 
action. All of these assumptions might seem fair and unquestionable from a certain 
cultural perspective. But what we take for granted as sensible will seem tenuous 
once we evaluate them from another cultural viewpoint. For example, could the 
notion of an agent with an individually, embodied consciousness make sense to a 
Melanesian dividual (Strathern 1988)? Would the idea of the brain as the seat of 
consciousness and personhood sit well with the Japanese notion of personhood 
	
36 
(Lock 2002)? The point being made here only affirms how agency, following 
Ahearn’s earlier definition, is socioculturally mediated. Critically suspending our 
underlying assumptions about death, personhood, and consciousness create a space 
for considering posthumous agency.  
 
Most of the scholarly literature that discusses the agency of the dead focuses 
on the agency of the corpse, or the bodily remains of the dead.  Huntington and 
Metcalf (1979, p. 211) observe that the corpse's power lies in its "evocation and 
association": "At the sight of a corpse, emotions surge through the individual 
chaotically: fear, rage, curiosity, sympathy, even joy, for he or she is dead and you 
are not." The dead evoke a strong affective response from the living because of 
their corporeal presence. We, the living, are moved by the dead as we “relate to the 
texture, sensation and the very aesthetics of the dead body” (Sorensen 2009, p. 130). 
Scholars suggest that the emotive appeal of the dead is derived from their materiality 
rather than from the ontological fact of death itself.  In her book, The Political Lives 
of Dead Bodies, Verdery (1999) addresses the importance of materiality by analyzing 
the properties of the corpse. She argues that dead bodies are potent political 
symbols because as material objects they “can be moved around, displayed, and 
strategically located in specific places”; they are “making [the] past immediately 
present”; and “their corporeality makes them important means of localizing a claim" 
(Verdery 1999, pp. 27-28). The presence of the dead body is an immediate, urgent, 
and concrete fact that cannot be ignored or dismissed. Its materiality stakes a claim 
on the social space of the living. Another property of the dead body is its 
"ambiguity, multivocality, or polysemy" (Verdery 1999, p. 28). The corporeality of 
the dead evokes many different meanings from different people in different 
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contexts.  Unlike other material objects, the materiality of dead bodies is seen to 
embody the pre-deceased. Williams (2004, p. 266) affirms that “the physicality and 
materiality of the dead body and its associated artefacts, structures and places can 
be seen as extensions of the deceased’s personhood, actively affecting the 
remembrance of the deceased by the living and structuring future social action.”   
 
 Williams (2004, p. 265) raises and addresses the important question of 
whether this potency of the dead could be construed as a form of agency:  
How might we consider the dead as having agency when, by definition, 
they cannot seemingly act or think on their own behalf? The key lies in 
the frequently observed evidence that, for many cultures, the social, 
symbolic and mnemonic significance of the dead body does not end 
with the extinguishing of vital signs. 
 
The dead simply do not remain dead; they remain socially, symbolically, and 
mnemonically significant. They live on through the distributed instances of their 
personhood; the dead continue to interact through their physical and material 
remains. Hence, “the corporeal presence of the dead provides an agency to affect 
the experience and actions of mourners and evoke memories of the past, rather 
than serving as a static and passive set of substances manipulated and disposed of 
by mourners to serve their sociopolitical agenda” (Williams 2004, p. 265). Scholars 
have asserted this, for instance, in the influence that the dead have over their own 
mortuary and funerary rituals. For example, the figure of the dead ruler continues 
to exert influence in the manner of his burial (Huntington & Metcalf 1979) and in 
Williams’ own research, the remains of the dead become “agents in their own 
transformation and reconstitution” during cremation and post-cremation rites 
(Williams 2004, p. 265). The dead body’s agency even becomes more manifest and 
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complex as the dead participate in the larger society. Verdery (1999) confirms this 
in the political agency exercised by dead political figures.  The potential of dead 
bodies to exercise greater agency is suggested in the motivation of Tibetans to self-
immolate, knowing that burnt corpses are perceived to be politically powerful than 
living protesters (Makley 2015). Similarly, the exhumed remains of the civilian 
victims during the Spanish Civil War and the Franco dictatorship exercise greater 
political agency posthumously compared to when they were alive (Rubin 2015). 
 
Studies on the agency of the dead have generally expounded on how the 
physicality and materiality of the dead exert agency over the living. The issue of how 
the dead acquire agency has been pursued by other scholars who, in explaining the 
acquisition of such agency, deploy Alfred Gell’s theory of the agency of art objects. 
In his book, Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory, Gell (1998, p. 5) argues 
that “persons or ‘social agents’ are, in certain contexts, substituted for by art 
objects.” His extension of social agency to inanimate objects follows from his 
definition of agency: 
Agency is attributable to those persons (and things...) who/which are 
seen as initiating causal sequences of a particular type, that is, events 
caused by acts of mind or will or intention, rather than the mere 
concatenation of physical events. An agent is one who 'causes events 
to happen' in their vicinity. As a result of this exercise of agency, certain 
events transpire (not necessarily the specific events which were 
'intended' by the agent) (Gell 1998, p. 16) 
 
Scholars have been recently applying Gell’s theory of agency in arguing that dead 
bodies have agency (Harper 2010; Tung 2014). Previously, the theory has been 
employed to argue that material objects of the dead such as their clothing are 
“attributed powerful, even disturbing agency” (Hallam & Hockey 2001, p. 114). 
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Also, it has been adopted to explain how the cremated ashes of the dead have 
exerted agency in “their own transformation and reconstitution” (Williams 2004, p. 
284). 
 
While Gell’s theory has argued for the agency of inanimate objects in 
general, its application in death studies has been limited to and dependent on the 
actual corpse or the material extensions of the person as inanimate objects 
possessing social agency. It raises the question of whether Gell’s theory can still be 
applicable when the corporeal remains of the person—corpse, ashes, bones—are 
not physically present. A key towards establishing the foundations for partly 
answering this problem can be gleaned from Hallam et al. (1999) who argue that 
the body is not necessary to the persistence of self-identity or social presence 
beyond physical death. This is something I intend to discuss in greater detail in the 
next chapter. 
 
Recent research has gone into exploring the notion of how the dead can 
exercise agency online. Stokes (2011b, p. 378) argues that online social networks 
provide the technologies for “extended phenomenality” where the dead can 
continue their “agential and phenomenal reach”, though in a thinner yet significant 
way.  In defining “extended phenomenality” as the “phenomenal sense in which, 
for us if not for the dead themselves, their moral identity extends beyond the 
boundaries of their biological lives”, Stokes (2011b, p. 369) also implies 
posthumous personhood for the dead. Since they are perceived phenomenally as 
retaining personhood even in death, it follows that they retain agency as well. Meese 
et al. (2015) examine three different ways that digital media can extend personhood 
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after death. In suggesting that different online platforms can blur the distinctions 
between the living and the dead by reconstituting the pre-deceased into the 
deceased through digital technologies that simulate the pre-deceased person, Meese 
et al. (2015) offer affordances of posthumous agency that may be said to truly 
extend, through digital algorithms, the agency of the living.  As Meese et al. (2015, 
p. 418) point out, “the affordances of online platforms now contribute to a techno-
social context where the boundary between the living and the dead becomes 
increasingly indistinguishable, and at particular points, even inconsequential”.  
 
Despite the possibilities offered by online digital technology, scholars 
themselves generally take a measured stance in terms of granting the online dead 
full agency (Harper 2010; Tung 2014). For instance, while Stokes (2011b) has shown 
that the dead can possess some agential faculties, Stokes (2011a) further argues how 
our recollection of the dead as concrete, specific, and distinct individuals confers 
on them the actuality and otherness that allows them to claim and make moral 
demands on us. Despite the loss of reciprocity, there is a phenomenal sense of how 
their identity and presence persists even beyond their biological life. The 
dependence of the dead on the recollection of the living recognizes that though 
they can continue to exist, in multiple senses of the term, they live on in a radically 
diminished way. This diminishment challenges the quality of agency exerted by the 
dead. Nevertheless, as I will argue, the sociality of social network sites such as 
Facebook compensates for this diminishment by mediating the agency of the dead 
throughout the social network of the dead.  
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Particularly in the next chapter, this thesis contributes to the growing 
literature of the agency of the dead in exploring the possibility of how the online 
dead, in the absence of their corporeal and physical remains, can acquire and exert 
agency. I do not intend, however, to pin agency on the dead as an entity, but I argue 
that posthumous agency on Facebook is socially distributed (Wertsch et al. 1996) 
and technologically mediated (Dobres & Hoffman 1994).  
  
There is no need to summon the dead because they are already embedded 
in everyday life. Walter (2015) argues that the dead are afforded possibilities of 
presence in society through the availability of communication technologies. The 
dead can be present when people talk and write about them. The dead maintain 
their presence through letters that they have written, books that they have authored, 
artworks that they have created, and in music that they have composed. 
Photographs provide a visual reminder of the deceased. With the availability of 
video and audio recording devices, the dead are further imbued with a phenomenal 
and animated presence. In tracing the development of communication 
technologies, Walter (2015) shows how technology has assisted the dead in 
constructing new social groups “from the oral construction of family, to the 
megalithic construction of fiefdoms, to the written construction of world religions 
and nations, to the photographic and phonographic construction of celebrity-based 
neo-tribalism, to the digital reconstruction of family and friendship relationships” 
(pp. 228-229). From here, it is possible to draw out the implications of technology 
on the presence of the dead. Firstly, the technologies that are used in 
communicating to each other become a viable medium through which the dead 
extend and maintain their social presence post-mortem. Secondly, the increasing 
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sophistication of technologies have made this presence durable and vivid. Thirdly, 
this technologically mediated presence enables the dead to have an impact on 
society.  
 
The dead, however, cannot directly use technology. It is the living who use 
technology to ensure that the dead remain part of their lives. Klass et al. (1996) 
coined the term “continuing bonds” to refer to the meaningful relationships that 
the living can have with the dead. The theory of continuing bonds has been 
employed by many scholars in explaining how the dead are brought back into the 
social world of the living. There is a growing literature on how continuing bonds 
have been applied to explain online mourning and memorializing in the internet. 
While early research has focused on the strategies that the living adopt in order to 
maintain their relationship with the dead, the findings also implied how the dead 
become present through these online practices. For example, De Vries and 
Rutherford (2004, p. 23) suggest that one of the prominent themes in web 
memorials—the deceased “watching over” the living— “imply a continuing and 
active relationship with the dead.” In another study, Nager and De Vries (2004, p. 
54) confirm how bereaved daughters’ web memorials exhibit a similar sense of 
being watched over by their deceased mothers.  
 
Recent literature has shown that continuing bonds with the dead has 
intensified through social network sites. Brubaker and Vertesi (2010) argue that 
interacting with the dead on social network sites can be seen as another 
technospiritual practice (the use of technology to express religious beliefs about the 
dead). Echoing the earlier findings of De Vries and Rutherford (2004) and Nager 
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and De Vries (2004), Brubaker and Vertesi (2010, p. 2) confirm that this 
commitment to continue one’s relationship with the dead assumes that the dead 
continue to participate in and watch the affairs of the living. Similarly, the findings 
of show that the living use social network sites to maintain a continuing bond with 
the dead. The language of mourners when posting to Facebook profiles manifest a 
lower non-immediacy index (which measures psychological distancing) suggesting 
that online mourners are not psychologically distancing themselves from the 
deceased (Getty et al. 2011, p. 999).  
 
In general, digital technologies such as the internet are reconfiguring how 
we interact with the dead (Refslund Christensen & Gotved 2014; Dilmaç 2016). 
Walter et al. (2012, p. 275) shows that social network sites “bring dying and grieving 
out of both the private and public realms and into the everyday life of social 
networks beyond the immediate family, and provide an audience for once private 
communications with the dead”. Further, Walter (2014, p. 11) suggests that online 
mourning has seen a return to what he terms as the “pre-industrial mourning”, that 
was marked by a communal, shared experience of grief. Moreover, Nansen et al. 
(2014, p. 113) argues that instead of letting the dead “rest and repose”, digital 
technology is creating an “increasingly restless posthumous presence”. The dead 
are brought back to life, re-animated through lively forms of media.  
  
Studies affirm the peculiarity of social networking sites as a medium for 
making the dead present in the social lives of the living. In the article, Beyond the 
Grave: Facebook as a Site for the Expansion of Death and Mourning, Brubaker et al. (2013) 
discuss the distinctiveness of Facebook as a medium that affects death and 
	
44 
mourning by enabling three expansions: temporal, spatial, and social. Temporal 
expansion increases breadth and immediacy of interactions which allow for the 
interweaving of death into everyday life. Spatial expansion removes geographical 
barriers that increase participation in and allows grieving from multiple locations. 
Social expansion disseminates information across previously separate social groups. 
These expansions provide a new temporal, spatial, and social space for the living to 
interact with the dead. Moreover, social networking sites enables users to “articulate 
and make visible their social networks” (boyd & Ellison 2007, p. 211). Articulating 
(in the sense of linking) and visualizing (by graphically representing and showing) a 
person’s social network illustrate how social networking sites, as a technology, can 
provide the infrastructure to visibly and publicly connect the dead to their social 
networks, and render them as visible, public presences in other people’s social 
networks. Bell et al. (2015) affirm that a social networks site such as Facebook 
“enables the deceased to be an ongoing active presence in the lives of the bereaved” 
by encouraging multiple practices of remembering the deceased. Facebook fosters 
a unique way of communicating and maintaining relationships with the dead 
(Degroot 2012) and creates a “novel, ritualized, and public space for maintaining 
these continued bonds” (Irwin 2015, p. 143). 
 
To explain the kind of presence that the dead have on a virtual medium like 
Facebook, I turn to the concept of "telepresence" (Lombard & Markaridian 
Selverian 2008), which is “the perceptual illusion of nonmediation” (Lombard & 
Ditton 1997). This definition applies to any medium. According to Lombard and 
Ditton (1997, sec. 2 par. 1):  
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The illusion of nonmediation can occur in two distinct ways: (a) the 
medium can appear to be invisible or transparent and function as would 
a large open window, with the medium user and the medium content 
(objects and entities) sharing the same physical environment; and (b) 
the medium can appear to be transformed into something other than a 
medium, a social entity.  
 
The concept of telepresence seems to be crucial in explaining how interactions with 
the dead on social network sites can evoke their presence even though one is only 
interacting, from a certain perspective, with residues or remnants of the pre-
deceased.  
 
The dead are undeniably establishing a growing and active presence on the 
internet, especially in social network sites like Facebook. Their active presence must 
be telling us something about some kind of agency that needs to be further 
examined and explained.  
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CHAPTER THREE: Posthumous Agency and the Corpse 
 
The dead have an effect. The ambivalence that they evoke in the living 
(Palgi & Abramovitch 1984, p. 386) means that the dead cannot simply be ignored. 
Malinowski ([1925] 1948) describes how our “love of the dead and loathing of the 
corpse, passionate attachment to the personality still lingering about the body and 
a shattering fear of the gruesome thing that has been left over” express complicated 
and contradictory attitudes. While Malinowski does not explicitly distinguish 
between the dead person and its corpse, his description seems to imply that we 
respond positively to the personhood of the dead just as we react negatively to the 
dead body. But in practice, do we clearly distinguish between the dead person and 
the corpse? Do we respond accordingly to what we might perceive as differences 
in the corporeality of the dead and the personhood of the dead? I believe that no 
matter how we answer these questions; whether we consider them as person or 
corpse; whether they are treated positively or negatively, or both; the dead 
undoubtedly affect us.  
 
The ambivalent reactions that the dead arouse in the living appear to stem 
from the fact that we cannot dissociate the person we know from the corpse. The 
corpse in front of us is not just an inanimate, insensate object; it—rather, he or 
she—reminds us of the dead person. The corpse, however, is more than just a sign 
pointing to the deceased. Thomas Laqueur (2015) recounts the story of the Greek 
philosopher Diogenes, also known as the Cynic, who made an odd appeal—that 
his dead body be thrown and fed to animals. Diogenes wondered why anyone, 
including himself, would have to worry about what happens to his corpse since he 
	
47 
would not be feeling anything anymore by then. Laqueur agrees with Diogenes’ 
logic, but he disputes the conclusion that the dead body is inconsequential: 
[T]he dead body matters, everywhere and across time, as well as in 
particular times and particular places. It matters in disparate religious 
and ideological circumstance; it matters even in the absence of any 
particular belief about a soul or about how long it might linger around 
its former body or about what might become of it after death; it matters 
across all sorts of beliefs about an afterlife or a God. It matters in the 
absence of such beliefs. It matters because the living need the dead far 
more than the dead need the living. It matters because the dead make 
social worlds. It matters because we cannot bear to live at the borders 
of our mortality (Laqueur 2015, p. 1).  
 
If the corpse is more than what it is, then what else is there to it? Is it a human 
subject or is it a material object? The archaeologist Carl Knappett (2005, p. 12) 
provides a basic, but useful criterion: human subjects are animate, while objects are 
not. The dead body cannot be a proper human subject since, without the vitality of 
life, it cannot possess the intentionality that is said to characterize human 
subjectivity. But then, inanimate as it is, it also resists being categorized as a mere 
object or thing, as Laqueur has stressed earlier. The dead body heightens this 
ambiguity because the dead seems to oblige the living to attend to its physical 
remains. Indeed, there must be something more to the corpse.  
 
Instead of resolving the ontological status of the corpse, Laqueur (2015, p. 
5) emphasizes that, throughout history, evidence shows that “We care about, care 
for, feel with a dead body, although we know that instantly or very soon after what 
we call biological death it notices nothing, cares for nothing, feels nothing”. The 
contradiction behind our treatment of the corpse is confounding. If the corpse is 
unconscious, unsympathetic, and insensate, then Diogenes is right in saying that it 
deserves no special treatment. Are we then being absurd in how we feel compelled 
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to tend to the dead body? Laqueur (2011, p. 800) claims that our affection for the 
corpse arises out of “primal sensibilities” that uncomfortably coax us into feeling 
that “There seems to be something wrong under almost any conceivable set of 
beliefs about not caring for it”. While he does not sufficiently expound on how these 
instinctive moralities came about, he nonetheless concludes that the import of the 
dead body lies in how it is “constitutive of a person existing in our individual and . 
. . historical consciousness” (Laqueur 2015, p. 54). The corpse matters because its 
matter belongs to that of a human being. Prior (1989, p. 20) assesses that the dead 
body is “first and foremost a site of personhood”. The corpse does not only 
symbolize death in the abstract, rather it is treated as the corporeality of an actual 
person to whom we are, in one way or another, related.  
 
The effectiveness of the dead is embodied by the corpse. The corpse 
physically and materially constitutes the person that once was, is, and will be. The 
dead body becomes potent through what it evokes and what is associated with it 
(Huntington & Metcalf 1979, p. 211). Apart from indexing the dead, the corpse 
denotes the reality of death that has befallen this person just as it likewise reflects 
the possibility which awaits our own personhood. Viscerally and cognitively, the 
corpse arrests and binds our attention to the deceased. In addition, the intensity of 
the corpse’s effect could be found in its capacity to mediate and establish copresence, 
which is understood as a way of “feeling the presence of people and places involving 
all of the five senses” (Baldassar 2008, p. 52). The spatial, temporal, and material 
nature of the corpse lend copresence to the dead. Paradoxically, the corpse makes 
the dead copresent, despite the absence of vital signs indicating a living, corporeal 
presence.  
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Apprehending the dead’s copresence through the mediation of the dead 
body imbues the corpse with greater potency. The corpse becomes a potent agent 
when it is seen to represent, preserve, and extend the agency of the deceased. In 
addition, the materiality of the corpse, even while exhibiting traces of physical decay 
and corruption, establishes the dead’s copresence even when the physical 
resemblance to the deceased person could hardly be established anymore. As long 
as there is the tiniest shred of evidence that a material substance is derived from the 
actual corpse, it will be regarded as embodying and expressing the personhood and 
agency of the dead. According to Gell (1998), this cognitive process, of making a 
causal inference that the agency things exhibit could be traced to the intentions of 
a human agent, is called an “abduction of agency”. This concept, which initially 
gained currency in explaining the agency of art objects14 (Gell 1998; Van Eck 2010), 
has also proved useful in demonstrating how an entire corpse or its dismembered 
body parts could earn and express agency (Harper 2010; Tung 2014).  
 
While the corpse is argued to be an agent, its agency is not intrinsic, as 
discussed above. Rather, it derives its agency, or shall we say, its agency is abducted, 
from an agent who was once living. In other words, to be clear about it, posthumous 
agency seems viable when one construes the agency of the dead as abducted from 
the agency of the pre-deceased agent. Returning once again to a more or less 
                                                
14	Gell	(1998)	uses	the	term,	art	object,	as	a	theoretical	tool.	For	him,	“The	art	object	is	whatever	
is	inserted	into	the	‘slot’	provided	for	art	objects	in	the	system	of	terms	and	relations	envisaged	
in	 the	 theory”	 (p.7).	 Gell’s	 definition	 of	 an	 art	 object,	 which	 he	 insists	 is	 unnecessary,	 is	 a	
reaction	to	a	semiotic/semantic	theory	of	art	 in	anthropology.	 In	particular,	he	positions	his	
argument	 against	 Howard	Morphy’s	 (1994)	 proposition	 that	 art	 objects	 are	 “sign	 vehicles,	
conveying	 meaning,	 or	 they	 are	 objects	 made	 in	 order	 to	 provoke	 a	 culturally	 aesthetic	
response,	or	both	of	these	made	simultaneously”	(Gell	1998,	p.	5).	
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conventional definition of an agent as “one who has the capacity to initiate causal 
events in his/her vicinity, which cannot be ascribed to the current state of the 
physical cosmos, but only to a special category of mental states; that is, intentions” 
(Gell 1998, p. 19), Gell (1998, p. 36) distinguishes primary agents from secondary 
agent; primary agents are “entities endowed with the capacity to initiate 
actions/events through will or intention”, while secondary agents are “entities not 
endowed with will or intention by themselves but essential to the formation, 
appearance, or manifestation of intentional actions”. Following Gell (1998) and 
Harper (2010), corpses are better understood as secondary agents, in the sense that 
they are conduits of the primary, intentional agency of human beings. Being a 
secondary agent, however, does not mean that corpses are not “real” agents; they 
are said to act, not of their own accord, but by channeling the agency of the dead.  
 
Though it is often described as wooden and stiff, the corpse is malleable, 
exhibiting its pliability in engendering different meanings in different contexts. For 
instance, it has been described as a “representation of death and the hereafter” 
(Prior 1989, p. 21), a repository of a culture’s fear and anxiety (Emerick 2000, p. 
48), an accomplice (Williams 2004), an effective agent (Hockey et al. 2010), a 
political actor (Verdery 1999; Young & Light 2013), a secular relic (Tarlow 2016), a 
magical amulet (Matteoni 2016), and a celebrity (Foltyn 2016). By listing some of 
the various meanings of the corpse, we are highlighting what the corpse does, which 
is a way of saying that these situations allow us to detect its agency. The possibilities 
of the corpse, that is, the other effects that it can cause, further affirms its agency. 
As Harper (2010, p. 311) argues, “By acknowledging that the dead body is not a 
uniform entity but one that can hold a multiplicity of meanings and therefore be 
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different things, we move towards the concept of the dead body as a social agent”. 
So far, we have seen how corpses become agents by mediating the agency of the 
dead. We have also briefly reviewed some of the ways and milieus in which the 
corpse displays agency. 
 
I further build on these insights by emphasizing that what complements and 
augments posthumous agency is Verdery’s (1999) argument that it is the corpse’s 
materiality that makes it potent. Corpses have certain characteristics that they share 
with material objects: they “can be moved around, displayed, and strategically 
located in specific places”; they make “[the] past immediately present”; and “their 
corporeality makes them important means of localizing a claim" (Verdery 1999, pp. 
27-28). The materiality of the dead body offers stability, which grounds the dead in 
the physical and temporal world. At the same time, this materiality contributes to 
the dead body’s mobility, which allows it to be deployed for various purposes in 
physical and symbolic terms. The duality of the corpse—as stable and mobile—
allows it to stake a physical and sensuous claim on the social space of the living, 
while allowing the living to make a similar claim on the dead. There is an immediacy, 
urgency, and concreteness to the corpse that makes it unlikely to be ignored or 
dismissed, thus amplifying the dead’s potent agency.  
 
Moreover, another property which relates to the malleability, mobility, and 
potency of the dead body is its "ambiguity, multivocality, or polysemy" (Verdery 
1999, p. 28). Corpses generate multiple meanings because they are, first and 
foremost, bodies of real people who have lived and embodied the complicated 
reality of human existence. An additional reason for the ambiguity of corpses is 
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because bodies are like sheets that are constantly being written on. This is not to 
say that we come into existence as a clean slate. Meaning, for instance, is culturally 
and socially inscribed into our bodies. Iris Marion Young’s (2005) essay, Throwing 
Like a Girl, illustrates how the naturalness and unnaturalness of our bodily 
movements are due to socializing and gendering practices. In other words, whether 
they are living bodies or lifeless corpses, there is nothing natural about our bodies. 
Corpses signify many things because just like the human agents that they once were, 
they retain the complexity of social relations in their corporeal state. They are 
ambiguous because what we do to dead bodies and what dead bodies can do are 
ultimately mediated by socio-cultural constructions and conventions. Furthermore, 
the symbolic potency of corpses is aided by the fact that they are now mute; 
therefore, “words can be put into their mouth—often quite ambiguous words—or 
their own actual words can be ambiguated by quoting them out of context” 
(Verdery 1999, p. 29). 
 
In this chapter, I have explored the theme of posthumous agency as the 
agency of the corpse. I have shown that the corpse is a unique, concrete entity, 
which is neither a subject nor an object, but mediates agency through its manifold 
effects and possibilities. I have also shown that the corpse matters a significantly in 
evoking posthumous agency because its matter embodies the personhood of the 
deceased. I further showed that the materiality of the corpse creates copresence for 
the dead, which in turn, generates a phenomenal sense of agency for the corpse. 
While I have shown how the corpse’s agency is abducted from the primary agency 
of the pre-deceased, I have argued that the peculiar characteristics of the corpse’s 
materiality augment and intensify the agency of the dead.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: Posthumous Agency and the Objects of the Dead 
 
There is another way of construing posthumous agency. Our interactions 
with the dead are mediated by material culture (Hallam & Hockey 2001). Since 
material culture mediates death, then virtually any object can be an agent for the 
dead. Things that display agency fall along a range of “dedicated” or “emergent” 
objects. Dedicated objects are created for the specific purpose of memorializing the 
dead, while emergent objects are those that have been initially intended for various 
purposes but have become mnemonically potent because of social contexts and 
relations where it has come to be associated with the deceased (Hallam & Hockey 
2001, p. 50). The ubiquity of material culture can be observed in how death practices 
and rituals across cultures utilize objects and places. There are dedicated memory 
objects that we immediately associate with death, such as coffins, urns, and 
tombstones. They can also be places (Gibson 2011) that have been usually marked 
and reserved for the dead: cemeteries, graves, mausoleums, and morgues. Local 
mourning customs and practices are identified with the use of certain things: 
wearing black or white clothing, lighting candles to remember the dead, and 
decorating with white lilies during funerals. Aside from the usual material culture 
that we readily associate with death, there are also emergent memory objects that 
do not immediately register as death-related. We often overlook paintings, 
sculptures, books, and musical compositions as having to do with the material 
culture of death. But they are related, once you consider that many of these thinkers 
and artists who have contributed to our intellectual, artistic and cultural patrimony 
are long deceased. My iTunes playlist, for example, contains a list of dead singers—
I am often unaware that I am listening to a dead person (except now, of course!) 
whenever Karen Carpenter sings “Close to You”, and yet, decades after her death, 
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her voice moves me in so many ways. The dead seem to be everywhere, continuing 
to shape the world we live in. 
 
The technologies we use to communicate—written notes, diaries, 
photographs, voice recordings, videos, emails, social media accounts—do not only 
allow us to ‘speak’ to the dead, but in materializing and representing the dead, these 
technologies allow the dead to ‘speak’ to us. But the dead do not only ‘speak’, Walter 
(2015) reports how the dead express their agency by organizing new social groups 
throughout history with the help of that epoch’s means of communication. Of 
course, the dead cannot literally speak or write; but whenever we talk about the 
dead, or read what the dead have written when they were still alive, they extend 
their influence beyond their lifetime. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
internet has become the current arena for the dead’s social presence. As a material 
culture, the internet constantly shifts along the continuum of dedicated and 
emergent memorial objects. While it was invented to connect computers in a 
network, the ubiquity of the internet has allowed the creation of dedicated memory 
objects such as virtual cemeteries and web memorials (Roberts & Vidal 2000; 
Roberts 2004a, 2004b, 2006); however, its wide range of applicability also makes it 
an emerging memory object. Social network sites, for example, were meant to 
connect people who have established an online profile, but with user deaths, these 
sites have provided affordances for the dead to remain socially alive and active 
(Bailey et al. 2014; Bell et al. 2015).  
 
Material objects exhibit a unique capacity to move and affect us especially 
when they are associated with the deceased whom we personally know. These 
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objects, places, and spaces—their personal belongings, towns they once visited, and 
rooms that they once lived in —evoke not only the memories but also the presence 
of the dead. While material culture could be romanticized as the positive mediation 
of the dead’s presence, the reality of how material objects mediate the dead is 
complicated. Judith Simpson examines the ambivalence that emergent memory 
objects, such as the dead’s clothing, generate in the living:   
The dual nature of this power is noted: if it is the presence of the dead 
that is evoked, this can be comforting, healing; if it is the manner of 
their death, or the fact of their absence that is underlined, it is deeply 
distressing (Simpson 2014, p. 253). 
 
Further, Hallam and Hockey (2001, p. 114) argues that social contexts can 
confer a “powerful, often disturbing agency” on ordinary, everyday things. Drawing 
on Carol Mara’s (1998) account of how she handled and dealt with her son’s 
clothing after the road accident which claimed his life, Hallam and Hockey (2001, 
p. 115) argues that the clothing’s emotive potency was due to the fact that since the 
clothes were the last “point of material contact” with the body of Mara’s son, they 
also became for her a “memory material” as well as a “material extension” of her 
son’s personhood. Furthermore, Hallam and Hockey (2001, p. 115) notes the 
ambivalent effect of the son’s clothing on Mara; that while the clothing evoked the 
presence of her son, it also reminded her of the painful details of the accident 
through marks and tears in her son’s clothing. Despite the unpleasant memory that 
it roused in her, Hallam and Hockey (2001, p. 115) interprets Mara’s inability to 
throw away her son’s clothing as evidence of its “emotional power” and “terrible 
potency”.  
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Material objects, regardless of where they fall along the range of dedicated 
and emergent memory objects, exhibit posthumous agency through an abduction 
of the deceased’s agency, in the same manner that corpses have been demonstrated 
to possess social agency (Harper 2010). This abduction happens within certain 
social settings and personal associations, which makes the agency of these things 
“relational and context-dependent” (Gell 1998, p. 22). Gell distinguishes the terms 
agent (that which “causes events to happen”) and patient (“the object which is 
causally affected by the agent’s action”) to establish this relationality: “for any agent, 
there is a patient, and conversely, for any patient, there is an agent” (Gell 1998, p. 
22).  He continues that “in any given transaction in which agency is manifested, 
there is a ‘patient’ who or which is another ‘potential’ agent, capable of acting as an 
agent or being a locus of agency” (Gell 1998, p. 22). The abduction of agency in the 
social relationship between agent and patient plays out through the interaction of 
four terms, which Gell identifies and defines as follows: 
Indexes: material entities which motivate abductive inferences, 
cognitive interpretations, etc.; 
Artists (or other 'originators'): to whom are ascribed, by abduction, 
causal responsibility for the existence and characteristics of the index; 
Recipients: those in relation to whom, by abduction, indexes are 
considered to exert agency, or who exert agency via the index; 
Prototypes: entities held, by abduction, to be represented in the index, 
often by virtue of visual resemblance, but not necessarily (Gell 1998, p. 
27). 
 
These terms, which can be assigned either in an agent or patient position, 
give rise to 16 elementary, binary expressions.15 Entities are situated in this network 
                                                
15	 See	Appendix	 2	 for	 a	 complete	 list	 of	 binary	 expressions.	Gell	 uses	 a	 kind	of	 notation	 to	
represent	these	social	relations	resulting	in	a	quasi-equation	that	(Davis	2007)	delightfully	calls	
a	“gellogram”.	I	intend	to	use	the	same	term	from	this	point	on,	with	as	much	delight.		
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of social relations called an art nexus.16  Since, in principle, an index can refer to any 
material entity that can be abducted, we follow Harper (2010) in her appropriation 
of Gell’s (1998) theory to argue for the agency of the corpse, and further build on 
it, by substituting another material entity in place of the corpse.  I turn to reexamine 
how the clothing of Mara’s dead son acquires agency by replicating the same 
gellogram17 and tabular format that Harper (2010, p. 314) has employed, and 
appropriately filling in the references to the art nexus terms with pertinent details 
from Mara’s account: 
 
[[Prototype-A]	-->	Artist	A]	-->	Index-A]	---------->	Recipient-P	18	
                                                
16	Since	Gell	works	towards	an	anthropological	theory	of	art,	it	obviously	makes	sense	to	refer	
to	“art	objects”	as	situated	in	an	“art	nexus”.	Though	as	I	have	noted	in	an	earlier	footnote,	
following	Gell,	we	can	replace	the	slot	of	the		“art	object”	with	any	other	object.	I	retain	the	
term	 “art	 nexus”	 as	 a	 tribute	 to	 Gell’s	 contribution	 to	 the	 formulation	 of	 this	 theory.	 See	
Appendix	1	for	a	visual	table	of	the	art	nexus	(Gell	1998,	p.	29).	
	
17	See	note	3	above.	
	
18	Gell	(1998,	pp.	51-52)	details	the	meaning	of	this	gellogram:		
	
This	expression	refers	to	a	nexus	 of agent/patient	relationships	such	that	the	recipient	 is	 the	
'patient'	and	the	agent	acting	on	him	is	the	index.	This	is	the	relationship	between	a	(secondary)	
agent	 (the	 index)	and	a	 'primary'	patient,	 in	 this	 instance,	 the	 recipient.	 I	adopt	 the	graphic	
convention	of	always	 indicating	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 index-agent	and	 the	 'primary'	
patient	in	a	relation	by	the	use	of	a	long	arrow	‘---------->’	as	opposed	to	the	short	arrow	‘-->'	
indicating	 subordinate	 agent/patient	 relations.	 Because	 of	 the	 centrality	 of	 the	 index,	 it	 is	
always	immediately	to	the	left	(or	occasionally	to	the	right)	of	the	long	arrow.	Agents	are	always	
placed	to	the	left	of	patients;	the	terminations	'-A'	and	'-P'	are	really	redundant	because	any	
term	to	the	 left	of	another	 is	always	 interpreted	as	an	 'agent'	with	respect	to	 it;	however,	 I	
retain	 the	 '-A'	 and	 '-P'	 suffixes	 because	 they	 make	 the	 resulting	 formulae	 more	 readily	
intelligible,	or	at	least,	I	hope	they	do.		
	
[…]	The	index	is	an	agent	with	respect	to	the	recipient	by	virtue	of	the	fact	that	the	recipient	
abducts	the	agency	of	the	artist	from	it.	The	index	is	an	agent	(with	respect	to	the	recipient)	
but	it	is	simultaneously	a	patient,	with	respect	to	the	agency	of	the	artist,	which	it	mediates.	
This	‘indirect’	relationship	between	the	recipient	as	patient	and	the	artist	as	agent	is	expressed	
in	our	formula	via	the	brackets.	The	term	‘index’	 includes	within	itself	another	term,	‘artist’;	
thus,	‘[Index]’	expands	to	become	‘[[Artist]	Index]’.	Adding	‘-A’	and	‘-P’	suffixes,	and	the	agency	
arrow	indicating	the	artist	is	an	agent	with	respect	to	the	index,	this	becomes:	[[Artist-A]	-->	
Index-A]	--------->	Recipient-P.		
	
Finally,	in	the	above	formula,	the	prototype	also	makes	an	appearance	as	an	agent	with	respect	
to	the	artist,	the	index,	and	the	recipient.	This	can	only	occur	when	the	abduction	is	made	that	
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Table 1. Terms and References 
 
TERM REFERENCE 
Index	 	 Clothing	
Artist19	 	
Recipient	 Mara	
Prototype	 Son		
 
Replacing the terms with the references, and considering that the agency of the 
Artist was not abducted in this specific scenario (and therefore, must be taken out), 
we would now have this gellogram: 
 
[[Son-A]	-->		Clothing-A]	---------->	Mara-P	
	
where Mara, as patient, abducts the primary agency of his dead son through the 
clothing itself. The problem, however, in this expression of abduction is that we are 
approaching it from a different context, that is, we are the ones making an inference 
that this could be probably be how Mara was abducting in that scenario. Invoking 
Gell’s principle that abduction of agency is always contextual and relational, we are 
overlooking a crucial aspect of this formulation that this formula makes sense to 
us, as observers, but not necessarily to the Mara as the recipient herself. But the 
very fact that abduction is contextual and relational, we can therefore explore other 
scenarios to account for the likeliest kind of posthumous agency that Mara herself 
might have detected.  
                                                
the	activities	of	the	artist	are	subordinated	to	the	prototype,	for	example,	to	the	appearance	
of	the	prototype,	as	in	realistic	forms	of	art,	such	as	portraiture.	
	
19	This	reference	to	this	term	is	deliberately	left	blank.	Unlike	in	Harper’s	(Harper	2010,	p.	314)	
example	of	the	groomed	corpse,	where	the	mortician	is	placed	as	the	artist	responsible	for	the	
preparing	the	corpse,	the	artist	responsible	for	the	clothing	is	insignificant.	While	it	could	be	
argued	that	the	clothing	(as	index)	that	the	son	(as	prototype)	wore	could	also	be	attributed	to	
the	agency	of	a	tailor	 (as	artist),	 it	seems	unnecessary	 in	this	particular	case	because	 in	this	
particular	context,	and	Mara	(as	recipient)	only	abducted	the	personhood	and	agency	of	her	
son	(as	prototype)	in	the	clothing	(as	index).			
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One likely scenario to explain why the clothing seemed to manifest an 
ambivalent, but powerful agency, is to reconstruct the gellogram with the term that 
was taken out earlier, ‘[Artist]’, to denote that there is another relation that could be 
abducted as being responsible for the index. To further signify that this new relation 
is now being abducted by the recipient as the primary agent responsible for the 
index that represent the prototype, the term ‘[Artist]’ has to be moved to the 
leftmost part of the gellogram as shown in the notation below: 
 
[[Artist-A]	-->	Prototype-A	]	-->	Index-A]	---------->	Recipient-P	
	
Having reconstructed the gellogram, we then fill in the template by replacing the 
terms with their references, and inserting either ‘[Driver]’ or ‘[Car]’  for the term 
‘[Artist]’ to indicate that, given the context of the accident, they are now being 
abducted by the recipient as the primary agent responsible for the index: 
 
[[Driver-A]	-->	Son-A	]	-->	Clothing-A]	---------->	Mara-P	
[[Car-A]	-->	Son-A	]	-->	Clothing-A]	---------->	Mara-P	
	
From these expressions, we can see that when the agency of either the Driver or 
the Car is being abducted by Mara through the clothing, the impulse to throw the 
clothes away becomes understandable. If the clothing reminds Mara more of the 
deeds of the Driver and Car as primarily causing the death of his son, then index 
becomes very disturbing indeed. Mara (as recipient) would find the agency of her 
son (as prototype), abducted through the clothing (as index), to be overshadowed 
by the malicious and more potent agency of either the car or driver (as artists) who 
have also been abducted as the primary cause of the appearance or characteristics 
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of the clothing (as index). We could thus only imagine how pained and torn Mara 
must have felt to see the marks on his son’s clothing.  
  
Since abductions are contextual and relational, there could be many possible 
and complex permutations in how a human recipient can abduct agency from an 
index.  This could explain why the objects of the dead could be powerful in the 
sense that objects can have many social relations that can be abducted from them. 
Furthermore, this clarifies why we can also be experience a great ambivalence in 
terms of the objects that we associate with the dead. The pre-deceased person may 
not be the only and primary social relation that can be abducted from an index. 
Having said this, it now becomes understandable why Mara found it difficult to 
throw away his son’s clothing despite the unpleasantness that it evoked. We can 
thus see that the posthumous agency of the dead through material things can be 
highly evocative and ambivalent. While the materiality of objects, places, and spaces 
allows the dead to exercise their social agency, materiality also means that other 
agents can also exercise their social agency in relation to things, thus creating 
ambivalences in how posthumous agency is being perceived.  
 
To sum, I have discussed the importance of material culture to our 
relationship with death and the dead. I have shown how materiality mediates the 
presence and agency of the dead; media technology affords them with a platform 
to preserve and circulate their agency. I have argued in this chapter that the objects 
of the dead become agents through an abduction of the pre-deceased’s agency, 
which is always contextual and relational. I have shown the implications of this 
contextuality and relationality in terms of how objects of the dead can be potent, 
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complex, and ambivalent agents through their interactions with other agents and 
with human patients who can make infinite abductions of agency. In addition, this 
section has demonstrated how Gell’s art nexus helps understand how objects of the 
dead can evoke posthumous agency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
	
62 
CHAPTER FIVE: Posthumous Agency and Continuing Bonds 
 
Finally, I turn to explore the theme of posthumous agency through the 
experience of the bereaved. Margaret Stroebe and her colleagues (2008, pp. 4-5) 
define bereavement as “the objective situation of having lost someone significant 
through death”, clarifying that someone significant refers to “personal losses 
experienced across the lifespan: the deaths of parents, siblings, partners, friends, 
and…one’s own child”. For the bereaved, the dead are not nameless and faceless; 
they are the beloved dead. The dead person is not a total stranger but a loved one. 
This personal connection implies the existence of emotional and affective ties 
between the dead and the bereaved. That is why when a loved one dies, the 
bereaved experience grief, which is defined as the “primarily emotional (affective) 
reaction to the loss of a loved one…[which] incorporates diverse psychological 
(cognitive, social-behavioral) and physical (psychological-somatic) manifestations” 
(Stroebe et al. 2008, p. 5). The findings of a comparative study of grief in 78 cultures 
suggested that many people in almost all the cultures that were being documented 
had difficulties dealing with death; with the Balinese as the only exception 
(Rosenblatt et al. 1976). Recent research, however, disproves the earlier conclusion 
made regarding the Balinese; just because they were good at concealing their grief 
did not mean that they did not find death difficult along with everyone else (Wikan 
1990). Despite this fact suggesting the seeming universality of grief, Rosenblatt 
(2001) cautions against approaches that seek grief universals since these tend to be 
premised on essentialist views that undermine the social construction of grief. 
Instead, Rosenblatt (2008) argues that a more profitable approach would be to 
consider how expressions and understandings of grief vary significantly across 
cultures.  
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Approaching grief from a social constructionist perspective (Rosenblatt 
2001; Neimeyer et al. 2014) provides a critique of the dominant Western view that 
stigmatizes ‘abnormal’ expressions of grief. The variations in how and how long 
people grieve may be conditioned by mourning practices. While grief and mourning 
has been used interchangeably by some scholars, Stroebe et al. (2008) believes that 
there is a difference. Unlike the individual experience of loss implied by grief, 
mourning refers to “the public display of grief, the social expressions or acts 
expressive of grief as shaped by the (often religious) beliefs and practices of a given 
society or cultural group” (Stroebe et al. 2008, p. 5). Strong proponents, however, 
of the view that grief that exceeds a certain amount of time has to be diagnosed as 
a mental disorder Prigerson et al. (2008) have successfully argued for the inclusion 
of prolonged grief disorder (PGD)—defined as the “intense, prolonged symptoms 
of grief coupled with some form of functional impairment beyond 6 months post-
loss” (Maciejewski et al. 2016, p. 266)—in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) (2015); thus, enshrining the 
medicalization and pathologization of grief that does not fit within this prescribed 
norm.  
 
In contrast to the view that grief needs to be resolved by disengaging from 
the dead within a certain amount of time, the theory of continuing bonds (Klass et 
al. 1996; Klass 2001, 2006, 2014) demonstrates that cross-cultural data show that 
the bereaved tend to maintain a continuing attachment to their deceased loved ones. 
Rather than trying to detach from the dead, Klass et al. (1996, p. 22) argue that 
“resolution of grief involves continuing bonds that survivors maintain with the 
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deceased and . . . these continuing bonds can be a healthy part of the survivor’s 
ongoing life”.  Klass (2001) further offer evidence that continuing bonds are 
implied in cultural practices involving an embodied sense of the dead’s presence, 
conversing with the dead, following the dead as moral guides, and recounting a 
personal narrative of the dead.  
 
Recent research, however, has questioned the efficacy of continuing bonds 
theory in terms of resolving grief (Field et al. 2005; Boelen et al. 2006; Field 2006; 
Schut et al. 2006; Field 2008). While scholars of grief and bereavement generally 
question the therapeutic claims of continuing bonds, what remains indisputable is 
the growing evidence that people engage in continuing bonds with the deceased. 
Whether this practice suggests adaptive or maladaptive behavior is beyond the 
concern of the argument that I am making. The strong evidence of the sociality 
behind continuing bonds underlies the concern of this anthropological inquiry. 
Continuing bonds with the dead clearly acknowledges the agency of the bereaved. 
But what does it mean for the dead?  
 
Continuing bonds demonstrate that “survivors hold the deceased in loving 
memory for long periods, often forever, and that maintaining an inner 
representation of the deceased is normal rather than abnormal” (Klass et al. 1996, 
p. 349). While the notion of continuing bonds gives the impression that the 
bereaved are the only ones acting on the passive dead, research affirming how the 
bereaved practice continuing bonds argues otherwise. An investigation into the 
inner representations of the dead among university students reveals that the 
deceased play an active and significant role in the lives of the living (Marwit & Klass 
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1996). The dead express their agency in being role models (“Mother is my role model. 
I still draw upon her wisdom and learn vicariously many things, and make decisions the way she 
would.”), providing guidance in certain situations (“I always think about her when I’m 
trying to make a decision on some big event in my life. I think ‘What would she do?’), orienting 
others in their life values (“Thinking about him [mentally handicapped brother] makes me 
more appreciative that I am alive. It has made me and my family more caring towards all 
underprivileged people.”), and by simply being part of a person’s life (“Now my dad is 
someone we enjoy reminiscing about. He is still missed by the entire family. We wonder what he 
would be like 12 years older and what he would be doing.”) (Marwit & Klass 1996, pp. 300-
301).  
 
From these examples, and in relation to the general themes of continuing 
bonds (Klass 2001), we could see how the dead, even without their physical or 
material presence, exhibit agency as moral guides for the living. While this manner 
of continuing bonds might seem to loosen agency from being always embodied, the 
reality is that the dead’s presence is still being mediated and embodied by the living 
through their practices of commemorating the dead. I will later explain the 
relationship of embodiment and remembering the dead in greater detail. It must be 
noted, however, that the dead are not always positive, encouraging, and helpful 
agents; Klass (2014) recently brings up continuing bonds with ‘hostile dead’ who 
also exercise their malevolent agency on the living. The hostile dead might even be 
perceived as exercising an even greater sense of agency to the extent that “some 
deceased persons are denied agency altogether, deliberately annihilated, or just 
forgotten” (Straight 2006, p. 108) by the living who fear them. We often think that 
the power inherent in agency needs a body in order to be more potent, but as the 
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hostile dead has shown, they can be even more powerful without a body, so much 
so that, they must be deliberately resisted and denied.  
 
Sensing the deceased’s presence is another expression of continuing bonds. 
The peculiar thing about this manner of continuing bonds is that it could be 
construed, from a certain perspective, as hallucinatory. Yet research suggests that 
sensing the presence of the dead is common and widespread, despite the skepticism 
of some. For example, upon interviewing a sample of 293 bereaved spouses, Rees 
(1971) reported that almost half of the respondents talked of sensing the presence 
of their deceased spouses. Though he concludes that this experience appears to be 
common and normal to widowhood, in referring to these episodes as 
‘hallucinations’ and ‘illusions’, Rees’ (1971) terminology betrays the incredulity of a 
Western biomedical paradigm towards this phenomenon. Nevertheless, succeeding 
research have reported similar findings of people sensing the presence of the dead.  
 
The sense of the deceased’s presence varies; Bennett and Bennett (2000, p. 
140) describes that “At its weakest it is a feeling that one is somehow being watched; 
at its strongest it is a full-blown sensory experience—olfactory, auditory, visual, and 
occasionally tactile”. The privileging of ‘materialist’ over ‘supernaturalist’ discourses 
in certain cultures engender ambivalences in how people might interpret and 
acknowledge this felt experience (Bennett & Bennett 2000). On the other hand, 
local beliefs and customs that are rooted in cosmologies that accommodate 
supernatural entities assist not only in normalizing but in fostering this experience 
(Hsu et al. 2003). Though our bodily perception of the world is inflected by culture, 
the occurrence of sensing the dead’s presence is widespread: 
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Across cultures, there is a sense that for many people death does not 
end relationship with the deceased; rather, the deceased continues as a 
presence in various senses of the word in a person's consciousness and 
perhaps even in what the person experiences as reality (Rosenblatt 
2003, p. 857). 
 
The difficulty with the notion of sensing the presence of the dead seems to be the 
absence of a physical corpse or material object associated with the dead. Taking it 
from the perspective of Gell’s theory, how can we abduct agency if there is no 
material index to motivate such an abduction? This question makes sense when we 
consider once more how material culture mediates our dealings with the dead 
(Hallam & Hockey 2001). The main objection in arguing continuing bonds as 
posthumous agency is that, in continuing bonds, the dead seem to be contingent 
mental representations whose existence depends on the psychological disposition 
or belief systems of the bereaved. It follows that if the dead and their influence are 
all made up in the mind of those who survive them, then the dead cannot be agents 
at all since what they are and what they are purported to intend are merely figments 
of one’s imagination. I disagree with the idea that the agency of the dead is 
imaginary; I agree, instead, with Hallam et al. (1999, p. 121) that this objection is 
still coming from the assumption that agency can only manifested by social beings 
who are capable of “individual, intentional, and embodied action”. The widespread 
and cross-cultural phenomenon of people sensing the dead’s presence must not be 
invalidated as a kind of mass delusion.  
  
So, how could we account for this experience without being dismissive and 
condescending? I propose to address this concern by revisiting embodiment. 
Csordas (1993, p. 135) argues that embodiment is our “mode of presence and 
engagement in the world”. This means many things, but I will expound on four 
	
68 
implications of embodiment. First, as a mode of presence, our bodies establish our 
presence in the world. The world knows that ‘I am’ because of my body. I know 
that ‘I am’ and that ‘I am in this world’ because of my body. In fact, I only come to 
know all these because of my body, which leads us to the second point. Awareness 
is always embodied, meaning that I come to know that ‘I am’ through my body just 
as I come to know the world through my body. Third, this awareness of self and 
the world comes with the awareness that I am in the world with other bodies. That 
there are others like me but are not me is a key insight of embodied presence. 
Fourth, I relate to others and to the world through my body.  Embodiment is not 
only a mode of being and knowing, it is also a mode of acting. While being 
embodied allows me to act in the world and engage others, it also allows me to be 
acted upon by others and by the world. Being embodied facilitates and marks social 
relations.  
 
The phenomenon of sensing the dead’s presence suggests how social 
relations are embodied. Relations are not abstract concepts; they are felt and 
embodied experiences. It is not surprising that the majority of the respondents who 
report sensing the dead’s presence are widows or widowers. Our relationships to 
our marital and romantic partners could be one of the most powerfully evocative 
bonds that we can experience in our lifetime. But, apparently, it is so robust that it 
can extend beyond one’s lifetime.  The stronger the bonds that I have with another 
person, the more bodily aware I will be of that person. That person will also have a 
greater bodily effect on me. The effect will be so great that even if the person is 
absent or dead, my body remains attuned to that person’s presence. We often speak 
of how persons leave their mark on us, but there are those persons whose mark 
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remains deeply felt. A useful way of thinking about this is to place this phenomenon 
as one of our “somatic modes of attention”, which Csordas (1993, p. 135) defines 
as the “culturally elaborated ways of attending to and with one’s body in 
surroundings that include the embodied presence of others”: 
To attend to a bodily sensation is not to attend to the body as an 
isolated object, but to attend to the body’s situation in the world. The 
sensation engages something in the world because the body is “always 
already in the world.” Attention to a bodily sensation can thus become 
a mode of attending to the intersubjective milieu that give rise to that 
sensation. Thus, one is paying attention with one’s body (Csordas 1993, 
p. 135). 
 
Sensing the dead may be viewed as an extended somatic mode of attention that puts 
us literally in touch with those whom we have been in touch with during their 
lifetime. While this might seem like a supernatural occurrence, sensing the presence 
of the dead uncovers how human existence is rooted in how embodiment ties our 
intersubjectivity to our intercorporeality (Csordas 2008).  
 
Positing that the “self is always embodied as well as always social”, 
McCarthy and Prokhovnik (2013) introduces the term ‘embodied relationality’, 
which implies that since embodiment is our mode of being in the world, we cannot 
but relate to and experience one another through our bodies: 
Embodied relationality thus allows us to consider a close, enfleshed, 
relationship as generating an ‘us’ that helps to shape the ‘me’ and the 
‘you’. The ‘me’ and the ‘you’ as well as the ‘us’ are expressed and 
constructed differently through diverse cultural and personal resources, 
and vary greatly in how the boundaries between these terms are 
understood. While ‘you’ and ‘I’ potentially have multiple identities, the 
‘us’ is a field of intensity between ‘me’ and ‘you’, expressed in an 
embodied orientation which includes but is not reducible to an affective 
attunement. ‘My’ sense of my own bodily integrity coexists with my 
strong sense of embodied relationality expressed in ‘us’. With the death 
of a loved one, the biological body of ‘you’ is buried or cremated, while 
the material presence of ‘you’ is not wholly erased but remains in 
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significant ways. But also, and crucially, the ‘us’ remains as an embodied 
relationality, held with ‘me’ in many embodied forms; the ‘us’ is written 
into ‘my’ body, and continues to have material presence after death 
(McCarthy & Prokhovnik 2013, p. 32). 
 
 
Embodied relationality lends credence to the reported experience where the dead 
can be sensed in and through our own bodies. I am not claiming anything new in 
saying that sensing the dead’s presence highlights the fact that we can only know 
through our bodies. Following the philosopher Gabriel Marcel’s (1950) 
phenomenological discourse on the body, since I do not only ‘have’ a body in the 
sense of having something that I possess, but that I ‘am’ my body in the sense that 
I am an embodied consciousness, the world that I know becomes intelligible only 
through my embodiment. In other words, our ways of knowing and relating will 
always be couched in bodily terms.  
 
 Our continuing relationship with the dead affirms that the deceased are not 
only imaginary entities that we tenuously hold in our minds, but that we maintain 
bonds with them because they are embodied in us. Therefore, rather than referring 
to how the dead can live on through us, it makes more sense to speak of how the 
dead live on in us. Being in relation to another suggests that our bodies/selves are 
not entirely ‘mine’ nor ‘yours’ anymore but they become ‘ours’ in the sense that 
‘mine’ and ‘yours’ embody ‘ours’ in social relations that go beyond death.  This leads 
us to an inevitable conclusion regarding how posthumous agency can be conceived 
even without the corpse of the dead, or without the mediation of things. But before 
that, we differentiate between corporeality and embodiment, where the former 
implies the body as a social actant, while the latter implies the body as a medium of 
social agency: 
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The body as social actant refers to the unmediated materiality of the 
body and its material actions and reactions that are socially realized 
without recourse to concepts of agency or intent. The body as a social 
agent, by contrast refers to its materiality being as inseparable element 
in the expression of personal and social identity (Gilleard & Higgs 2015, 
p. 17). 
 
Corporeality contextualizes our embodiment, which means that our social 
possibilities and limitations, our agency as humans, are contingent on the facticity 
of the body. I can act in certain ways because of the body. But I can also not act in 
certain ways because of the body. The body as corporeality is central to 
embodiment; without a body, I am nobody. Continuing bonds, however, allows the 
deceased, who are bereft of their own corporeality, to be embodied in another 
corporeality, and, through this embodiment, to act in the world and express their 
agency. Since the corporeality of the living is not a solitary but a social entity, it 
follows that this corporeality is inevitably an embodied relationality as well. Thus, 
we can see how sensing the presence of the dead is an embodied experience of the 
deceased’s agency in the world. The deceased, embodied in and through the 
corporeality of the living, concretizes their presence and agency in the world. 
Therefore, since the bereaved becomes the visible index of the dead’s agency, Gell’s 
theory is still applicable to continuing bonds.  
 
As we have hinted at in our discussion of continuing bonds so far, there are 
two difficulties in seeing how continuing bonds can be an expression of 
posthumous agency. The first difficulty is that continuing bonds appear to manifest 
a unidirectional agency that originates from the living and is directed towards the 
dead. With this impression, the dead merely becomes passive ‘patients’, bereft of 
agency, whose social existence and relevance depend entirely on whether the dead 
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will remember them. However, this would be a misrepresentation because death, as 
we have argued in the first chapter, is social at its core.  Moreover, there is evidence, 
as the bereaved acknowledge, that the dead continue to be actively involved and 
significantly influencing the lives of those who survive them (Marwit & Klass 1996). 
Therefore, the dead are not only passive, but they seem to be committed and 
involved agents, engaging in an ongoing interactive relationship with the living 
(Klass et al. 1996, p. 349; Normand et al. 1996).  
 
Continuing bonds, like all social relations, demonstrate how posthumous 
agency is situated within a web of living and deceased who are interacting with each 
other. While some theorizations of agency might give the impression that the world 
is like a still pond waiting for a pebble to be dropped in it in order to create a ripple 
that spreads throughout the surface, a phenomenology of posthumous agency, in 
this case, through the experiential accounts of how the living construe the effect of 
the dead on their lives, would wean us away from a mechanical view, which appears 
to be more concerned in locating the origins of this agency,  and move towards a 
experiential account of how agency that construes how agency is a lived experience 
felt, understood, and inferred by agents-in-a-world-with-other-agents.  
  
The second difficulty with continuing bonds deal with criticisms of how its 
practices evoke “hallucinatory”, “illusory”, and “supernatural” discourses. I have 
taken the track of arguing posthumous agency as the agency of the pre-deceased 
abducted by the living mediated through the corporeality and the materiality of the 
dead. From this perspective, certain expressions of continuing bonds through 
interactions with ghosts and spirits, or physically sensing the dead’s presence would 
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seem to lie beyond the scope of the approach that I have taken so far; presuming 
again after Hallam and Hockey (2001), that our relationship to the dead is materially 
mediated. What seems significant about continuing bonds as an interactive inner 
representation of the deceased is the implication that the dead can be still be 
evocative agents even without their actual corporeal presence, affirming what 
Hallam et al. (1999) contend about the body as unnecessary to personhood and 
social presence beyond physical death.  
 
However, as I have explained earlier in this section, the dead are not, in a 
manner of speaking, without bodies. They may be dis-embodied from their own 
bodies, but they are embodied in others.  Embodied relationality provides a way of 
understanding how the dead could be embodied in the corporeality of the living. 
This embodiment, which allows the dead to act in the world, does not suggest a 
kind of supernatural possession by the dead. Instead, the dead act in us and through 
us because, even without their bodies, our relationships are inevitably inscribed in 
our bodies. In continuing bonds, the agency of the dead, though disembodied from 
the deceased’s actual corporeality, is relationally embodied and realized in and 
through the corporeality of the living.  
 
A final point about continuing bonds suggest that posthumous agency is 
socially and culturally mediated. The dead and the living form a symbiotic 
relationship. Posthumous agency, as we have outlined in this chapter, is situated in 
a network of embodied relations. We have seen how a robust sociality generates 
greater agency for the dead. Bonds formed in significant relationships do not die 
along with the dead of the significant other. Rather, these relationships continue to 
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be socially mediated in interactions with the dead.  The widespread evidence of 
continuing bonds and the variations in how the dead are being perceived suggest 
that the social presence and the agency of the dead are culturally mediated. As we 
have argued in the first chapter, the social construction of death lends to different 
practices of how the dead are reintegrated into society. For example, in a 
comparative study of continuing bonds in Japan and in North America, Klass 
(2001) found that while both cultures manifest continuing bonds, the centrality and 
sophistication of death rituals and practices determine the extent of the influence 
of the dead in the larger society. The practices in which the dead are reintegrated 
into society modulate the agency that they wield in the social sphere of the living. 
Nevertheless, as social relations and culture are mediated by material culture, social 
and cultural inflections of continuing bonds remain expressed in tangible and 
embodied ways.  
 
In this chapter, I have explored the theme of posthumous agency through 
the theory of continuing bonds. I have argued that, though continuing bonds might 
assert the unidirectional agency of the bereaved, it affirms the agency of the dead 
by highlighting their influence in motivating the bereaved to maintain their bonds 
with the deceased. I have addressed two major doubts that arise from certain 
practices of continuing bonds in order to highlight that continuing bonds is a deeply 
embodied and corporeal agency of the dead. I have also shown that continuing 
bonds benefit the dead in establishing a robust sociality that provides them with the 
context to become co-agents of their continuing posthumous social presence. I 
have further argued that the continuing interest of the bereaved suggests that the 
agency of the dead encourages this interest. Moreover, I have also shown that 
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posthumous agency is socially and culturally mediated as evidenced by the 
widespread but culturally diverse ways that people maintain their bonds with the 
dead. Finally, I have argued that Gell’s theory is still relevant in theorizing the 
agency of the dead in continuing bonds.  
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CHAPTER SIX: Posthumous Agency on Facebook 
 
Coda: What then is Posthumous Agency? 
 
In this thesis, I have relied on Gell’s art nexus as a theoretical tool for 
making sense of how the inanimate—which is, really, what the dead are, after all—
become social agents. I have appropriated this theory in arguing for posthumous 
agency because phenomenological accounts of the dead’s presence resemble what 
Gell (1998, p. 13) calls as “art-like situations”, that is, instances when a “material 
‘index’ (the visible, physical, ‘thing’) permits a particular cognitive operation . . . the 
abduction of agency”. In other words, while we may refer to the dead in a general sense, 
more often than not, the dead for us, are our beloved dead who have impressed 
themselves on us in embodied and concrete ways. Our dead have names, faces, 
bodies, and histories. They are not abstract, imaginary entities. They are real persons 
whom we sense behind our experience with our dead. I have argued earlier that the 
dead, or rather, our experiences of the dead, are mediated by material culture. We 
use things to commemorate those who have passed away; it is also through things 
that we are reminded of them when we seem to have forgotten. I have also 
addressed that even in certain situation that seem to lack a corporeal presence or 
material mediation, the dead are not entirely disembodied; rather, they are in fact 
embodied in the corporeality of the bereaved, relying on the strength and 
embodiment of their social relations to mediate and extend their agency beyond 
death.  
 
There are two main points that can be drawn from our thematic treatment 
of posthumous agency. Firstly, posthumous agency refers to the secondary agency 
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of the ‘index’ motivating the ‘recipient’ to abduct the primary agency of the 
‘prototype’, modified by the presence or absence of an ‘artist’. In lay terms, 
posthumous agency is the agency of the pre-deceased abducted by those who 
survive them from any of the following indices: the corpse; objects, places, and 
spaces of the dead; and from the bereaved or mourners themselves. Secondly, the 
themes of posthumous agency demonstrate the centrality of the concept of 
mediation in detecting and expressing agency. The agency of the dead reflects 
Ahearn’s (2001, p. 112) definition of agency as “the socioculturally mediated 
capacity to act”, which, applied to this case, is detected and inferred from the 
mediation of the corpse, the material objects of the dead, and in continuing bonds 
with the dead. The mediation of culture, expressed through corporeality, materiality, 
and sociality, provide our heuristic lens in further examining the agency of the dead 
on Facebook. It could be argued that the emphasis on mediation shifts attention 
away from what ought to be the focus of agency, that is, on the nature of the agency 
itself. Since agency itself is a contested concept, as I have discussed in Chapter Two, 
I purposely veered from resolving what agency is, rather I side once again with Gell 
in saying: 
For the anthropologist, the problem of ‘agency’ is not a matter of 
prescribing the most rational or defensible notion of agency, in that the 
anthropologist’s task is to describe forms of thought which could not 
stand up to much philosophical scrutiny but which are none the less, 
socially and cognitively practicable. 
For the anthropologist ‘folk’ notions of agency, extracted from 
everyday practices and discursive forms, are of concern, not 
‘philosophically defensible’ notions of agency. . . . I am going to take 
seriously notions about agency which even philosophers would 
probably not want to defend. . . . I do so, because, in practice, people 
do attribute intentions and awareness to objects like cars and image of 
the gods. The idea of agency is a culturally prescribed framework for 
thinking about causation, when what happens is (in some vague sense) 
supposed to be intended in advance by some person-agent or thing-
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agent. Whenever an event is believed to happen because of an 
‘intention’ lodged in the person or thing which initiates the causal 
sequence, that is an instance of agency (Gell 1998, pp. 16-17). 
 
 
I have argued in the previous chapters how corporeality, materiality, and 
sociality mediate posthumous agency. I now address three questions to determine 
whether the dead on Facebook can be posthumous agents as well. Firstly, is there 
a ‘body’ on Facebook? Secondly, is Facebook a thing? Thirdly, does Facebook 
exhibit sociality?  
 
Is there a ‘body’ on Facebook? 
 
There are no physical bodies nor actual corpses on Facebook. There might 
be photos of bodies and corpses, but they do not exhibit the tangible physicality of 
human bodies. Williams (2004, p. 265) restates that the “corporeal presence of the 
dead provides an agency to affect the experience and actions of mourners”. If 
posthumous agency is expressed through the corporeality of the dead, how can the 
Facebook dead express agency if there are no physical corpses? While there are no 
actual corpses on Facebook, the absence of a physical body is substituted by a 
‘virtual body’, which is how persons are embodied in virtual space (Boellstorff 
2011). The virtual bodies of Facebook users are “distinctively tied to their 
corporeality” (Stokes 2011b, p. 365). Virtual bodies are thus referents of actual 
bodies.  
 
Facebook is one of many social network sites (SNS)20. As with all SNS, 
when you sign up for Facebook, you are first asked to create a profile. Your profile 
                                                
20	SNS	are	“web-based	services	that	allow	individuals	to	(1)	construct	a	public	or	semi-public	
profile	within	a	bounded	system,	(2)	articulate	a	 list	of	other	users	with	whom	they	share	a	
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becomes your basic online identity. It establishes your presence on Facebook. Users 
grow and cultivate their profile by adding more personal information about 
themselves. Giddens (1991) argues that the self in modernity is a ‘reflexive project’. 
Facebook profiles give evidence to the self as a reflexive project. This can be seen 
in how users groom their profile by deciding on what status updates to write, what 
photos and videos to display, what movies or songs to ‘like’, which friends to add, 
and so on. In building this corpus of information, profiles begin to embody the user 
on Facebook. Shilling (2003) argues that the increasing tendency in modernity to 
associate the self with the body has also resulted in the body becoming a project. 
On Facebook, grooming the profile is not only a project of the self but it also 
becomes a virtual body project. Thus, one’s profile on Facebook could be viewed 
as a virtually embodied self.  
 
Is Facebook a ‘thing’? 
 
It could be argued that Facebook is not a ‘thing’ because it is not a physical 
object. It feels, however, like a thing. For example, we can ‘see’ it and ‘interact’ with 
it; we can ‘use’ it to connect with friends, change our profile picture, or delete 
photos that we might have impulsively posted online. Joohan Kim (2001, p. 89) 
introduces the term ‘digital beings’ to refer to “all kinds of digitized information—
that is, a series of bi-nary digits or bits—that can be ultimately perceived by the 
human body”. Digital beings, however, are ambiguous: they are things, such as in 
their durability21; but they are also non-things since they are not bound by time and 
                                                
connection,	and	(3)	view	and	traverse	their	list	of	connections	and	those	made	by	others	within	
the	system”	(boyd	&	Ellison	2007,	p.	211).	
21	Durability	is	a	characteristic	which	permits	us	to	repeatedly	interact	with	things	(Kim	2001,	
p.	91).	
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space (Kim 2001). To resolve this paradox, Kim (2001) proposes that digital beings 
should be situated somewhere between material and mental entities.  Facebook 
profiles seem akin to digital beings. It might not seem obvious at first but our 
Facebook profiles are actually not just found on Facebook itself, but our 
information is stored somewhere in physical storage devices, distributed through 
wires and Wi-Fi, and accessed through computers or mobile devices by different 
people walking or sitting in different places at possibly simultaneous times. As 
digital beings, our Facebook profiles are “hybridized or spread across various 
dwellings , some physical and material, some digital and semiotic” (Graham et al. 
2013, p. 134). Facebook, then, is not less of a thing but more than just a thing.  
 
Does Facebook exhibit sociality? 
 
The fact that Facebook is a social network site seems enough to answer this 
question. But I think the more pertinent concern here is whether Facebook as a 
virtual space has created a new and totally different online sociality. It is commonly 
assumed that digital technology is a catalyst for change, for better or for worse. 
Facebook News reports and anecdotal accounts abound regarding how Facebook 
has altered the way we once related to each other. But this conclusion seems rather 
hasty. Miller and Slater’s (2000) ethnographic study of Internet use in Trinidad 
shows how offline and online life are intertwined: 
 The notion of cyberspace as a place apart from offline life would lead 
us to expect to observe a process in which participants are abstracted 
and distanced from local and embodied social relations. . .We found 
utterly the opposite. Trinidadians. . .invest much energy in trying to 
make online life as Trinidadian as they can make it, to see the internet 
as a place to perform Trini-ness (Miller & Slater 2000, p. 7). 
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This finding affirms Dobres and Hoffman (1994) argument that 
“technology is an arena for dynamic social interactions”. Sociality shapes 
technology. In another study of how people have adopted to the use of landline 
telephones in America, Fischer (1992, p. 260) argues that ““basic social patterns are 
not easily altered by new technologies…they are resilient even to widespread 
innovations”, rather new technologies “resulted in a reinforcement, a deepening, a 
widening, of existing lifestyles more than in any new departure” (p. 263). 
 
This becomes evident in how the sociality that underlies death shapes how 
online technologies are being used. In his PhD thesis examining Vietnamese online 
memorials, Anthony Heathcote (2015) argues that online practices suggest a 
continuity of offline practices of honoring and remembering the dead. Research 
into online grieving practices in web memorials and SNS have prominently featured 
and affirmed continuing bonds with the deceased.22 The massive evidence of 
posthumous sociality attests that online technology does not give rise to totally new 
forms of sociality; rather it only reaffirms how people socially interact. As Miller 
(2011, p. 217) observes, “the single most important attribute of Facebook is not 
what is new about it, but the degree to which it seems to help us to return to the 
kind of involvement in social networks that we believe we have lost”.  
 
 
                                                
22	 (Roberts	 &	 Vidal	 2000;	 De	 Vries	 &	 Rutherford	 2004;	 Roberts	 2004b,	 2006;	 Lombard	 &	
Markaridian	Selverian	2008;	Getty	et	al.	2011;	Degroot	2012;	Irwin	2012;	Kasket	2012;	Marwick	
&	Ellison	2012;	Walter	et	al.	2012;	Benavides	2013;	Brubaker	et	al.	2013;	Bailey	et	al.	2014;	
Egnoto	et	al.	2014;	James	2014;	Refslund	Christensen	&	Gotved	2014;	Rossetto	et	al.	2014;	Bell	
et	 al.	 2015;	 Brubaker	 2015;	 Gibson	 2015;	 Graham	 et	 al.	 2015;	 Irwin	 2015;	 Krysinska	 &	
Andriessen	2015;	Walter	2015;	Bouc	et	al.	2016;	Dilmaç	2016).	
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Posthumous Agency and the Facebook Profile 
 
Having shown that the same themes of posthumous agency are found in 
Facebook, I now build on these themes to explore how the scenario of active and 
public profiles of the dead on Facebook can express posthumous agency. 
 
I have referred to posthumous agency as the secondary agency of the ‘index’ 
motivating the ‘recipient’ to abduct the primary agency of the ‘prototype’, modified 
by presence or absence of an ‘artist’. While the agency of the index is only 
secondary, the index plays a central role: 
[U]nless there is an index, there can be no abductions of agency, and 
since the topic of this theoretical enterprise is precisely the abduction 
of agency from indexes, the index has to be present for analysis to 
proceed. One can construct formulae which lack the artist, or the 
recipient, or the prototype, but not ones which lack the index (Gell 
1998, p. 36). 
 
Posthumous agency on Facebook would be theoretically impossible without an 
index. That is why we had settle the question of whether there is body on Facebook 
or whether Facebook could be considered a thing. Even if only one of those 
questions was positively resolved, we would still be able to come up with an index 
that would make Gell’s theory applicable. The other question pertaining to sociality 
determines whether there are social relations that could make an abduction of 
agency from the index. On Facebook, the active profile serves as the [Index]. This 
profile represents the [Prototype], or the image of the pre-deceased23 user 
represented by the profile. The self-image of the user [Prototype] influences the 
                                                
23	I	use	the	word	pre-deceased	to	denote	that	the	agency	that	is	abducted	from	the	index	is	
properly	 derived	 from	 the	 primary	 agency	 of	 a	 human	 agent.	 In	 the	 context	 where	 the	
abduction	of	agency	is	being	made	from	the	profile,	the	predeceased	is	of	course	deceased.	In	
a	manner	of	speaking,	when	the	dead	is	said	to	be	exercising	agency,	it	is	actually	the	residual,	
primary	agency	of	the	pre-deceased.		
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[Artist] or the pre-deceased user creating the profile. The other users interacting 
with the profile will be the [Recipient].  
 
Following this, I interpret posthumous agency on Facebook as the agency 
of the pre-deceased abducted by other users through the existing profile created by 
the deceased, where: 
[[[Prototype-A]	-->	Artist-A]	-->	Index-A]	---------->	Recipient-P	
[[pre-deceased-A]	-->	pre-deceased-A]	-->	profile-A]	--------->	other	users-P	
 
 
Brubaker and Vertesi (2010, p. 2) observe that messages left on the “wall”24 of the 
dead user’s profile “commonly end with an assertion that the user, was, in fact there, 
participating, or watching”.  Kasket (2012, p. 65) verifies this in her own research 
where 77% of messages written for the dead on Facebook directly addressed the 
dead using a “second-person address (i.e. ‘you’)”. Facebook as a SNS seems to 
encourage an even greater abduction of agency and presence because in an earlier 
study of web memorials by Roberts (2004b) only 30% addressed the dead directly. 
These evidences suggest that other users generally abduct the pre-deceased in the 
profile. We thus modify the gellogram accordingly to reflect how prototype and the 
artist are conflated as agents of the Facebook profile: 
[[Prototype-A/Artist-A]	-->	Index-A]	---------->	Recipient-P	
[pre-deceased-A]	-->	profile-A]	---------->	other	users-P	
 
 
We have seen how the dead’s Facebook profile is essential to mediating the 
posthumous agency of the dead. Taking a philosophical approach, Patrick Stokes 
(2011a) argues that our recollection of the dead as concrete, specific, and distinct 
individuals confers on them the actuality and otherness that allows them to claim 
                                                
24	The	‘Wall’	is	now	obsolete	on	Facebook.	This	has	been	replaced	by	the	‘Timeline’.			
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and make moral demands on us. Seen in this light, the corporeality and materiality 
of the profile provide the concreteness, specificity, and distinctiveness for the dead 
on Facebook to exercise agency on their social network. Furthermore, the potency 
of the dead on Facebook is further augmented by SNS which “represent a 
technology for articulating, expressing, and expanding the agential and phenomenal 
reach of our anchored, socially recognized, intersubjective identity” (Stokes 2011b, 
p. 378).  
 
Looking at posthumous agency through the Facebook profile of the dead 
presumes that the profile is a kind of virtual corpse (Tucker 2014). Although I was 
initially inclined, following Tucker, to treat the profile as a virtual corpse, and 
similarly conclude that posthumous agency is inferred from the materiality of the 
profile, this understanding of posthumous agency on Facebook seems to stem from 
an old, profile-centric understanding of SNS. I argue that Ellison and boyd’s (2013) 
definition 2.025 of SNS recasts agency from being abducted through the profile as 
a user-generated page, to an agency which is more dependent on the social network 
of other users, and on the system-generated context that contribute to the evolving 
identity of the profile as well as  its enlivened presence in the newsfeeds/personal 
space of other users. Unlike a corpse, the profile of the dead tends to evolve. It 
becomes animated because profiles nowadays, based on the most recent definition 
of SNS, are a shared creation:  
                                                
25	SNS	2.0	definition:	A	social	network	site	 is	a	networked	communication	platform	 in	which	
participants	1)	have	uniquely	identifiable	profiles	that	consist	of	user-supplied	content,	content	
provided	by	other	users,	and/or	system	provided	data;	2)	can	publicly	articulate	connections	
that	can	be	viewed	and	traversed	by	others;	and	3)	can	consume,	produce,	and/or	interact	with	
streams	of	user-generated	content	provided	by	their	connections	on	the	site.	(Ellison	&	boyd	
2013,	p.	158)	
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Today’s profiles are not simply self-descriptive, static text, but rather a 
dynamic combination of content provided by the user (such as status 
updates), activity repots (such as groups they’ve joined), content 
provided by others (such as virtual gifts that are displayed on the profile 
or “tagged” photographs uploaded by others), and/or system provided 
content (such as a subset of one’s Friend network and activities on 
third-party sites.) (Ellison & boyd 2013, p. 155). 
 
After death, the profile becomes more dependent on others and on system-
generated content. Research on identity construction on SNS suggests, that on 
Facebook, “selves are constituted through interaction with others” (Livingstone 
2008, p. 407). The dead, it seems, do not remain as a static presence on Facebook. 
The fact that there is a certain dynamism to their profile would also bestow them 
with a dynamic agency in their network. Moreover, the robust sociality online 
evidenced by the widespread practice of continuing bonds in SNS assures the 
constant evocation of the dead’s agency on Facebook. In addition, Bell et al. (2015) 
argue that Facebook’s platform encourages multiple practices of commemorating 
the dead, which in turn, allows the dead to remain actively involved in the lives of 
those who survive them. That the profile of the dead can change depending on 
interactions in its social network would enliven the profile, and therefore, evoke an 
animated agency as well. Kember and Zylinska (2012, p. xvii) argue that this 
vitality— “the possibility of the emergence of forms always new, or its potentiality 
to generate unprecedented connections and unexpected events”—characterize 
media such as Facebook.   
 
The implications of sociality on Facebook seems to distribute posthumous 
agency throughout the social network of the dead. The sociality of the social 
network enlivens and generates more agency for the dead. Recent iterations of SNS 
emphasize its nature as a “networked communication platform” (Ellison & boyd 
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2013, p. 158) means that it becomes easier to connect and share content with 
everybody. “Streams of user generated content provided by their connections” 
(Ellison & boyd 2013, p. 158) activate the profiles of the dead enabling them to 
become more visible in their social network. Continuing bonds assure activity from 
the deceased’s connections; as other users generate activity, the dead’s profile 
appears more frequently in the news feed of the people through the deceased’s 
social network, thus creating even more possibilities for them to exert agency by 
evoking further interactions from the living.  A person writing a message on the 
Timeline of the dead sends a ripple effect throughout the social network, increasing 
the probability of the dead evoking another interaction from another node in his 
network. What this means is that as long as the dead is on Facebook, the sociality 
of the social network in which the dead is embedded guarantees his enduring 
presence and agency.   
 
Posthumous agency on Facebook tend to be evocative and vivid because 
new technologies afford “telepresence after death” (Lombard & Markaridian 
Selverian 2008). This kind of presence refers to the “perceptual illusion of 
nonmediation”, which occurs in two ways when:  
(a)The medium can appear to be invisible or transparent and function 
as would a large open window, with the medium user and the medium 
content (objects and entities) sharing the same physical environment; 
and (b) the medium can appear to be transformed into something other 
than a medium, a social entity (Lombard & Ditton 1997, sec. 2, par. 1). 
To visualize how telepresence affects posthumous agency on Facebook, we recall 
the gellogram below, which we have formulated to denote posthumous agency on 
Facebook: 
[pre-deceased-A]	-->	profile-A]	---------->	other	users-P	
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If you think about it, this notation of agency on Facebook does not differ from 
how living agents would be exercising their agency on Facebook. Brubaker (2015, 
p. 210) explains in his PhD thesis that “Technologically, the post-mortem account 
is no different than the pre-mortem account”. On Facebook, telepresence makes 
the profile transparent to both users such that the medium seems to put them 
directly in touch with each other. In the case of the deceased’s profile, telepresence 
further makes sense of the evidence revealing how other users continue to address 
the dead in the second person. The seeming invisibility or transparency of the 
medium implies that, the more technology simulates the reality of presence by 
appealing to as many senses as possible, the greater the perceptual illusion it creates, 
thus contributing to a greater sense of copresence. Posthumous agency on 
Facebook is potent because the mere presence of profiles of the dead serve as 
windows allows us to glimpse into the agent themselves. This transparency echoes 
Miller’s (Miller 1987) argument for the “humility of things”: 
[O]bjects are important not because they are evident and physically 
constrain or enable, we often precisely because we do not “see” them. 
The less we are aware of them, the more powerfully they can determine 
our expectations by setting the scene and ensuring normative behavior, 
without being open to challenge. They determine what takes place to 
the extent that we are conscious of their capacity to do so (Miller 2005, 
p. 5). 
 
Posthumous agency on Facebook relies on the humility of Facebook to 
encourage sociality through communication and interaction. In addition, deprived 
of the agency that has centered on the evocative and sensorial materiality of the 
corpse—the rigor mortis, the decaying body, the foul odor— the dead on Facebook 
continue to exhibit agency because the “absence” of this heavy sensory register 
snatches our attention away from the dead’s profile—the material technology of 
	
88 
SNS. On one level, the humility of Facebook hides the fact that our interactions 
with the dead are mediated and shaped by this technology. On another level, the 
humility of Facebook hides the concrete registers of death. In doing so, this 
technology makes us think that we are still interacting with the deceased whose 
actual corporeality, in fact, has long been missing from Facebook. Part of the 
difficulty, or the confusion, that we have in dealing with the dead on SNS is that 
while we do recognize them to be dead, they don’t appear to be dead. There is no 
corpse that serves as a sensory reminder of their deceased state. Their remains are 
not sequestered or hidden away from everyday view. Instead, they remain “alive”—
as though they were merely suspended in the virtual space as do all of the users on 
Facebook. The blurring of physical, spatial, and temporal boundaries characterizes 
a user’s presence on Facebook, regardless of whether one is still alive or dead. The 
fact that Facebook as a technology does not venture into algorithms to determine 
one’s mortal status is an indication of how, for this particular technology, concretely 
(virtually) mirrors the ambivalence that characterize our attitudes towards death. 
The transparency, humility, and ambivalence of this medium enable the potent 
agency of the dead. 
 
  
	
89 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In explaining this topic to people who are curious as to why I research dead 
people on Facebook, I ask them if they have ever wondered why the dead still get 
tagged in photos and posts, receive occasional greetings, and appear every now and 
then on their news feed just like the living. I tell them that this is not just a “glitch 
in the Matrix”26. Trying to make sense of these social interactions with the dead on 
Facebook has led me to consider why the dead, instead of being left out of the loop, 
remain socially active. Implicit in that involvement, of course, is the question of 
whether the dead have anything to do with that social presence at all. Could they 
be exercising posthumous agency, and, if so, how?  
 
Common sense might immediately dismiss this question as nonsense: how 
can the dead act if they are dead? In reviewing the anthropological literature on 
death, I have shown that the dead do not become totally extinct; rather, they are 
reintegrated and recirculated in society. Contrary to the assumption that “Death 
closes all”27, I have argued that the sociality indicative and constitutive of death 
reconstitutes the dead’s social existence, which further bestows on the dead the 
stature to wield influence over the living. Moreover, even though death engenders 
ambivalent attitudes and shifting discourses, I argue that this ambivalence works to 
the dead’s advantage because it implies that the dead would have to be a social fact 
                                                
26	A	popular	line	from	the	sci-fi	movie,	The	Matrix	(1999),	uttered	by	one	of	its	main	characters,	
Trinity:	“A	déjà	vu	is	usually	a	glitch	in	the	Matrix.	It	happens	when	they	change	something”.	
27	A	line	from	Tennyson’s	poem,	“Ulysses”.	
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that society must deal with and cannot ignore. Thus, the social presence and 
influence of the dead among the living needs to be carefully considered.  
 
Just as sociality constitutes death, death also constitutes sociality. 
Investigating this facet of death entails reconsidering what agency means. If the 
dead can generate social life, then what does that say about an agency that is often 
taken to be distinctive of human beings. Human agency presupposes a living, 
embodied, conscious, and intentional being. Clearly, the dead do not fulfill all these 
criteria. But, as I have discussed, agency is contested by different articulations that 
fall along a continuum that runs from agency as exclusively human on one end, 
towards a non-human and non-living agency on the other end. I have shown that 
since the interest in human agency has been historically and socially contingent, 
understanding how agency arises from a techno-social context could also evoke 
other forms and articulations of agency. Since current definitions of human agency 
that focus on the individual, on embodied consciousness, and on intentional action 
reflect certain cultural assumptions about personhood, evidence of other cultural 
models of personhood might deem conventional presuppositions of human agency 
inapplicable. Rather than being moot, I argue that the slipperiness of the concept 
of agency offers possibilities of recasting agency, even extending it to the dead.  
 
 I have examined how agency can be attributed to the dead in three ways: 
through the corpse, the material culture of the dead, and the practice of continuing 
bonds. Building on the work of Sheila Harper (2010) on the agency of dead bodies, 
I have also applied Alfred Gell’s (1998) theory of the art nexus to analyze further 
the agency of the dead through material culture and continuing bonds. I argue that 
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what these three instances of posthumous agency have in common is the mediation 
of an index—manifested in the corporeal, material, and social presence of the 
dead—which motivates a relational and contextual abduction of agency.  
 
In evaluating the Facebook profile of the dead through the heuristics of 
corporeality, materiality, and sociality, I have found Gell’s theory applicable to the 
dead on Facebook. I have argued, however, that while the Facebook profile of the 
dead is not a physical corpse nor a material thing, its status as a virtual body and a 
digital being creates affordances that resemble the strengths and augment the 
limitations of physical corpses and material things in invoking agency for the dead. 
I have also shown that being embedded on a SNS such as Facebook guarantees an 
enduring posthumous presence and agency that is mediated, sustained, and 
distributed throughout the social network. Lastly, I have shown that Facebook 
profiles manifest a potent sense of agency because of the seeming transparency of 
digital communication technologies in evoking telepresence.  
 
When I first sought to investigate posthumous agency on Facebook, I thought that 
I would only conclude with a concept of agency that contradicts a commonly held 
notion of human agency as life. But as I have realized upon concluding this thesis, 
posthumous agency seems to reveal how agency might straddle fuzzy boundaries—
that instead of just the living, it can be exhibited by the dead; that instead of being 
pinned on an individual, it can be distributed across one’s social network; that 
instead of being exclusively human, it can be shared and augmented by 
technology—giving further evidence of why agency has been such a contested issue 
for anthropology and the social sciences.  
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APPENDIX A: GELL’S ART NEXUS 
 
 
 Table 1. The Art Nexus (Gell 1998, p. 29) 
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APPENDIX B: BINARY EXPRESSIONS  
 
 
Expressions with Index as Agent 
Index-A ----------> Artist-P 
The index is the material thing which motivates abductions of an art-related kind.  
. . . in certain instances, it is an agency in the material of the index, which is held to 
control the artist, who is a patient with respect to this transaction (Gell 1998, pp. 
28-29). 
 
Index-A ----------> Recipient-P 
This is the elementary formula for 'passive spectatorship', which is of course not at 
all difficult to conceptualize or exemplify. Whoever allows his or her attention to 
be attracted to an index, and submits to its power, appeal, or fascination, is a patient, 
responding to the agency inherent in the index. This agency may be physical, 
spiritual, political, etc. as well as 'aesthetic'. (Gell 1998, p. 31) 
 
Index-A ----------> Prototype-P 
Here the index behaves as an agent with respect to its prototype. A familiar example 
of this is provided by Wilde's short story The Portrait of Dorian Grey, in which the ageing 
undergone by the picture in the attic causes the prototype to retain his youthful 
good looks indefinitely. . . . Another type of instance . . . is in sorcery, where the injury 
done to a representation of the victim causes injury to the victim  
. . . (Gell 1998, p. 32) 
 
 
Expressions with Index as Patient 
 
Artist-A ----------> Index-P 
This is the elementary formula for artistic agency. The index usually motivates the 
abduction of the agency of the person who made it. The index is, in these instances, 
a congealed 'trace' of the artist's creative performance. (Gell 1998, p. 33) 
 
Recipient-A ----------> Index-P 
This is the elementary formula for 'patronage' and/or 'the spectator as agent'. In so 
far as a recipient can abduct his/her own agency from an index, this formula is 
satisfied. One does not have to lift a finger in order to feel that one has 'made' 
something. (Gell 1998, p. 33) 
 
Prototype-A ----------> Index-P 
The agency of the prototype can frequently be abducted from the index. There are 
obvious ways in which 'prototypes' can have agency attributed to them. In our own 
art system this kind of agency is everywhere manifest, since it is essential to the 
notion of 'realistic representation'. (Gell 1998, p. 35) 
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Illegitimate Expressions 
 
Artist-A ----------> Prototype-P 
This is the general formula for 'imaginary' images made by artists. From our point 
of view, an index is an instance of 'imaginary' image-making, when its appearance 
is held to have been dictated by the artist and to be an index of his agency as an 
imaginer of the appearances of things. (Gell 1998, pp. 38-39) 
 
Prototype-A ----------> Artist-P 
[T]he formula for 'realist' image- making. Here, the appearance of the prototype 
dictates what the artist does. . . . The prototype, as social agent, in this case, 
impresses his/her/its appearance on the index, via the mediating agency of the 
artist, who is a 'patient' with respect to the prototype while remaining an 'agent' with 
respect to the index. (Gell 1998, p. 39) 
 
Artist-A ----------> Recipient-P 
This formula expresses the power of the artist as a social agent over the recipient 
as a social patient. Many works of art inspire wonder, awe, fear, and other powerful 
emotions in the spectator. (Gell 1998, p. 39) 
 
Recipient-A ----------> Artist-P  
[T]he formula for the 'artist as artisan', that is, a hired hand who does the recipient's 
bidding. (Gell 1998, p. 39) 
 
Prototype-A ----------> Recipient-P 
One might call this the 'idol' formula. Here the agency abducted from the index, by 
the patient-recipient, is that of the prototype, who, besides causing the index to 
assume a certain appearance, exercises social agency vis-a-vis the recipient. (Gell 
1998, p. 40) 
 
Recipient-A ----------> Prototype-P 
This is the 'volt sorcery' formula. Volt sorcery is the practice of inflicting harm on 
the prototype of an index by inflicting harm on the index; for example, sticking pins 
into a wax image of the prototype. (Gell 1998, p. 40) 
 
 
Expressions Showing Self-Reciprocal Agency 
 
Index-A ----------> Index-P  
An index can be seen as the 'cause' of itself. (Gell 1998, p. 41) 
 
Artist-A ----------> Artist-P 
Every artist is a patient with respect to the agency s/he exercises, indeed, artistic 
agency cannot proceed otherwise. (Gell 1998, p. 42) 
 
Recipient-A ----------> Recipient-P 
The category of 'recipients' splits into agents and patients in a very salient fashion, 
so much so that one might be tempted to deny that it was really a single category at 
all. The differentiation that I have in mind is that between 'passive spectators' (the 
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general art public) and 'patrons'-those who actually commission artists to produce 
works of art, and whose agency, as patrons, is consequently indexed in the works 
of art they have caused to come into existence. (Gell 1998, p. 47) 
 
Prototype-A ----------> Prototype-P 
The prototype of an index can be a patient with respect to the index which, by 
representing him or her, incorporates his or her agency. (Gell 1998, p. 48) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
